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SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to provide system development personnel with a set of general
guidelines for evaluating a newly developed cockpit alerting and warning system in terms of human
factors issues. Although the discussion centers around a general methodology, it has been made
specific to the issues involved in alerting systems. The approach has been to look to the future in
preparation for next generation commercial aircraft and the application of a mole mature technol-
ogy of automation. An overall statement of the current operational problem is presented, with an
attempt to describe the more salient human factors problems with reference to existing alerting and
warning systems. Next, the methodology for proceeding through system development to system test
is discussed, with special emphasis on the differences between traditional human factors laboratory
evaluations and those required for evaluation of complex man-machine systems under development.
The last section deals more explicitly with performance evaluation in the alerting and warning
subsystem using a hypothetical sample system, A further implicit purpose of this report is to
engender an industry consensus as to a logical, efficient, and economical way to proceed to a new
generation solution of the alerting system problem.
INTRODUCTION
NASA and the FAA have undertaken, at Ames Research Center, a review of the human factors
associated with cockpit alerting and warning systems (CAWS). The purpose was to study - and
where possible to outline - a method for assessing these systems in terms of human performance,
acceptance, and general operability.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
There is a growing awareness that the principal cause of commercial aircraft accidents is human
error. However, because the error is often embedded in a series of events, all of which contribute in
*NRC Associate,
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_l VCl3' conlplcx way to a t_vcn nlishap, it is u,_uall.v difficult to identify ;I ,_pecific probable c;luse.
Ne_'erthele_,_, it is usually ¢ompelliugly obvious that SOlUC kind of hulual_ error occurred and it is
Ctllzall.v t_bviotls Ill:it aircraft systenls :ire seldotn culpable.
Although it is difficult to identit3", ;rod ;llmosl impossiiqe to classify, specific instat_.ces of
htllll;lll error ill a¢cidcnt ¢;ItlS_llioll, the' deseri|3lions o1" thc SOtlrCCs of htltll_ill error for exatuple,
high wt_rkload, tatigue, di_ision of att.,'ntiou, cogt_iti_'e and judgmental load, and crew coordina-
tion are tlllatlinlotls. Olle :ltllhor (tel'. I') slates:
Complainls about our lack of uudcr,_t;inding of lilt "'why" of human error arc
a¢lltally exl_l'essiotls of l'rllstration ;Ibout tile inability to ¢otlntcr;IC[ _.'vel3.' hlltll_ltl
shortcotuing witl_ teclmology. Altllottgh accident rates in all t\artus of llyitlg iilatle a
no,,,cdiv¢ dul"itlg the last 25 yeat,n, one elusive factor has rcnl;lincd rclativel.v stable:
the perccnt_lgc of :lccideuts :lttribtttcd to tile t_ilot.
-['hcrc is little doubt thz_t any t'urthcr significant adwulccS in comnlcrci;ll aviation safety will be
brotlghl about by siuwlifyin_, the considerable resourccs-ulanagetuent lask of the flight crew. And
this must be a¢¢onl|qishcd wilhout redl|cing crew vigil:lnce or resourcefulness, arid without liu_iting
lh¢ ol_porTt|tlitics to exercise those aspects o1" [he htllllatl subsysletll which arc superior to
lechnologicld sysle|lls, ._uch ,Is adaplabilily, response to unprogralumcd contingencies, flexibility,
l;Isk i_erfortll:ltl¢C, lnelnor_ :llld discrete :llltt :lnalog intellig¢llt'c.
erie solution to sotuc of the Ililtll"_l wc_lktlcsscs itl illoilitoring conlt_lcx ,_ystctlls w_ls the
provisiotl o1" a sensory indic:ilion In tile t..i,,_ ,.'henevdr ;111 tltlt-_,'lt',,lolet'zltlde ct_nditioll occurred or
was itlllllinclal. Cockpit ;llcrling and yearning syslenls were inslallcd ;Is a "'reasonable" nlczln,_ of
;|ssistin',' IIic ;ill"crew to maitlt_tin sat\', reliable, eCOllOtlli¢_ll system operation itl the I,|cc of high
worklo:_ds. I{owevcr. these systems, intcuded t_ reduce h:_/ard, art' lhem.'_elves bccotlling h:l/ards.
Tllcy itllrOdtl¢¢ new l_roblerls rel:ltcd to _In alMOSt t|ncontrollcd i_rolitcr;llioll of ('AWS oi1 the
newer tuot'c ¢otuplex wide-body ,lircr;ift. In going t'rolu tile 1t-'?07 Io tile tl-747, the nund_er of
warning and ¢;lution ;doris inert,ileal frolll IS8 to 455 or 142";. The increase el'oil1 I'_('-S to I1C-Itl
v,'a._ |'ronl I "r• to 418 or 14.• , (rcf. ,, p. 48/,
i'hcsc problcnls associated with the various ('A_,'¢S ;src sutum,_ri/cd ;is follows;
I. I'hc pr_lil'cration of CAWS h,l.s caused air¢r_,,ws to t'requcutl.,, sies_ the sysletll,_ a.s _1llUisancc
t'alher IIi;111a help.
2. ,More ;derts require nlol"e nleluori/,_tion of uleanings, higher WOl"kioads, ;Ind gre;llcr prob:_-
bility of crrol'.
3. l'hc et-cdibilit._ of :ll:H'tlts dedrC:lSCS a_ tile ntttld+cr el' false alarms, due to Cqtlil+lllCllt I';liltll'e
;llltl illdol'rcet ._el|Jllg of._cll._or t hl'c,'_hold.'_, itldl'C:l,_¢,_.
4. Iluc to "'t'cst_Otls¢ c_,tinetioul'" st)tile frcqllCtllI.v hc;Ird :llerls :l¢ltlall_ go tlnhe,lrd or
Unheeded.
5. Aural ;lk, rts ill;ly t'lln¢tion ill _.'OlUpetitiott with c:lch other ;ind their tlt'sigtl t_lay bc t;l¢itl._
gO_Cl"UCd b._ th,ll COllr,idCl',tti_n r;lther lh_ln b.', thai tat"sinll_ly _lttt';lcthlg ;ilI¢lltlot_.
O. Because cockpit alertingand warning systems have not been treated as truc subsystcnls
which have a cotut,lonpurpose, cohesiveness,at|d functionalinterrelationship,theirpro[iferatioa
has not bccn couttollcd.
7. An aler-t.ing signal - aural, visual, or tactile - increases the workload even it" tile alert is
false.
8. Warning and alerting devices arc sonletinlcs used as shortcut solutions tk_r problcluS that
should be alleviated by better overall system design, l\_r example, automation, operational pro-
cedures, etc.
_. Tilt. alerting value of any signal decrcast.s dramatically as workload and attentiona[ demands
irt,-rease.
! 0. TIle absence ot" s.vstcms integration in tile cockpit as a whole tends to retard the trcatmetH
of CAWS as a true subsystem thereof.
Some cx;tmplcs of problems associatcd with cockpit alerting and warning systems are para-
phrased here to ilhlstrate some of the problems of human response to the_u:
Case ..1 (rt'f 3): As a l')C-q passed through rotational spt.cd the point just prior to
lifting off the runw;ty - a false stall warning occurred. The stick shaker activated
and the aural warning sounded. The pilot, r,:acting to these wart_ings', attcmpte,.t to
stop the takeoff but the jctlincr overran the runway, struck several approach light
stanchions, caught fire and bttn_cd. The pilot was convinced by tile steady and
persistent nature of the warning that it was valid and that the aircraft would ,lot ll.v.
Any one of tile nunwrous l_ossiblc iilalfunctions could have activated the stall
warning at rotation, the NTSB examining board said, bill all cxaminatioi_ of tilt' stall
war[lille s.vslelll COtllpOileilts |'trodl, h:ed ilo c'¢idcilce of illall'tlllCliOll.
With a stall warning, tl_ere is little time to accomplish a validity check. And, particuhlrl.v on
takeoff, re:lotion must be immediate. The el'lk'cts of this :tee[dent on the credibility of stti_sctluent
similar alarms is diMcult to assess but will probahly bt. stets[f [cant.
Cast' X (rc.t. 4). A captain told of ulaking :ul appropriate decision but of bt.tng placed
ill :t sitLlation in which only fortttnatc _rirctttllstanccs prevented a possible catas-
trophe. TIle aircraft flaps stuck in position 5 on approach ;lilt[ Wotlld extend no
farther. The captain elected 1o transition It, a 2" glide slope ill order to be ready for
faster spool-lip shotzld a go-around be ncccssar.v. While aflk'cting the approach
descent angle change, the sink rate increased to 1500 ft ;mill ,Itld glide slope was
departed. The ground twoxinlity warning sysIeIll ((,;l'WS'l was tl'ig,_2.ered atld, shlcc
there is no ptttlch-otlt capability aild the :ludio level of the voict, ann[nit[at[on is
extrciucl.v iligh: "'... all cockpit and tower ct_nluatuli¢:ltiOUs were blocked at this
tinlc. Speed callouts, sink rate elliot[Is, height above tile runway ¢:lllOtlls were not
possible. This, in efl\'ct, denied a coordinated crew I'ttnctioll." Under these condi-
tions a go-arotuld, which was possil+le given tile reported cnxirotltlletllal conditions,
SCellled to I_e ha/ardotts alad :1 very iill;ittl'aCli_,e alternative. This prol_ably would litlt
IQ,
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have been tile case had tile crew had the capability temporarily to deactivate tile
offending audio.
The GPWS has some special problems related to synthetic voice aonu,lciation. The captain who
related Case B also had some comme:its regarding the lack of identification of the reason for the
"'pullup" annunciation for four of the five GPWS modes.
Case C (rt,J_ 5): This example is referenced as a pilot incident report but it describes
a general response to a particular warning system .- the altitude capture and
deviation alert. After describing the many alerting audios attributable to this system
during a single flight, the author states. "this incident illustrates poor system design
in which a 'warning sound' is heard repeatedly during normal operation. The
'warning" sound becomes a normal sound and its warning value is negated. In order
to be eftk'ctive, a warning sound should only be heard when there is a discrepancy.
In operations each pilot hears this 'warning" sound approximately 360 times per
month. Now. if once every 6 months a pilot makes an altitude error, he is laced with
hearing a "warning" sound to which he has be._n conditioned 2000 times in normal
operation to ignore. This is an FAA requirement and should be changed. The light
should be retained as at present, but the sound should only be heard during an
abnormal operation such as an 'altitude error'."
The altitude alerting system, due to the operational difficulties associated with it. was recently
the subject of an FAA rule change (September 21, 1q77). Part 91.51 "'Altitude alerting system or
device; turbojet powered civil airplanes," now offers the option of having the aural alert not
operating in the altitude captttre mode; but it still nlust be active lbr deviations above and below the
captured altitude. For a full discussion of this issue see reference C_.
The Cast' C report is illustrative of the response to reD, high false alarm rates. It is necessar)." to
differentiate between false alarms occasioned by an actual sensor-alerting system malfunction and
those due to uot_critical or "routine" deviations or those due to sensor thresl_olds that are set too
low. Though due to different sources the net result is decreased credibility and increased annoy-
antes. These interlk-re with confident flight deck resource management by if.creasing perceived
(perhaps actttal) system indeterminacy. Indeterminacy in a system is roughly equivalent to uncer-
tainty in an intbrmation processing sense. It rel\'rs to lack of clarity as to t_!e number and kind of
system inputs, the number aTld kind of options i,i an output set, and their interrelationship it_ a
decision situation (rel_. 7 and 8). Note that a determinate system may appear indeterminate to a
novice or to one who has been improperly or inadequately trained on the opcr_ltion of the systems.
FORMAL DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
In order to l_rovidc a conceptual model for use in thinking through problems _lssociated with
CAWS, it is necessary to identify basic functions that do not change as a function of individual
warning systems. A successful technological approach to the solution of ('AWS-relatcd problems
requires a tbrmal model that is consistent aild unchanging. The development of sncl_ a |llodel is
attempted here through a systenl orientation and bv :H1 atlhcre|lce It) l'tmctional categories
identified as basic to all CAWS.
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l'hcse functionalcategoricsprovidea framework lhroutah whicll tilL' several human factors
arcas may b.:idc_liticdand discusscd.1"he approach begins to suggest the broader categoriesof
behavior svhich m;o or may not bc amenable to performance measurement. These behavior
categories arc identified:isthe alertingfunction, the inl\)rmingfunction, and cress'option and
coiitr_,_[.
The purpose of this document is not to dcsigi_ an idc:d alerting and warning system but to
suggest what is important to consider in the desig|t and evaluation of Stt¢|t systems, ttowcvcr; ill
taking a systcms view and in de:fling in fundamentals, it is soon seen lhat oplimism is justified l\_r
the next gcncration systems which combine thc many seemingly disparate systems into a truly
itttcgrated subsystem, p;_rticu[arl.v it"a microcompulcr is used :,s a unif.vin_, information processor.
What also begins to be apparent isthat<+bscrr,zbl¢"ht|nlanbehavior vls-a-viswarrfitlgsysten'|s,is
discrete,of tow frequency, and dubiously quatttifialqcexcept inlimitedcircumsta|tces,t'orexample,
part-taskstudies of the alcrtin,_power of an aural alert.The human factorsproblems arc seen,
rather,as: particularst,bsclof the more generalproI_Icmsel'llit_htmanagement, which is,in turn,a
subset ,of the t'ti.eht crcw's overall rcsourccs-tl'tattagctttcr_I tilsk. Factors that ittt'ItlCi1c¢ that perfor-
mance arc: ¢1"cm ssorkload: crcm plosical :utd meutal stale: crew coordination: tlight phase; aircraft
type: crcsv training and backgrounds; emcr._cncy and ahr, ormal procedures" company policy-
navigation and Air Traffic Control (ATC'h and we:flier.
The problems :|ssociatedwith tltcmcasurmncnt of Imman pcrfornmnce with respectto CAWS
arc similar to prolqcnts associated with other flightdeck activitieswilh spcci:flemphasis on
attention, divisiot_ of attcmion, s igil,m,:c, attd mo|titorhtg. A single statcmctlt or" the htttl'0.11, t:actors
problents in crcw response to {,'A.WSis11o|possilqc;however, significantelements of tileproblems
will be identitiot.
OBJI:t'TI'¢FS OF Tills I)OCUMFNT
Goals
The objectivesof this document arc dct'incdas l\+llows:
I. Pc provide.+a generalstatement that isrepresentativeof and in h:muony with the desiresof
concerned ind_vidu:flsin the indusPrial,user,m;d gos'crnment technological community iu their
ptll_Uil o!"a sigllificalllly inlproxcd cockpit alerting and warllhlg subsystem;
2. 1"oprovide a cohesive and useft|[ dcscriptiOl; of the burgcolting CAW.g problems"
.I. l',_ sugl._cst a point of view l'rolll which {,'AWS Ill:IV |'11,' regarded :is art aircraft Sll|'|sVslelll
rather Ill;tit :is a collcctiott of illdcpclldCllt entities:
4. 1"o describe the detailed task elements as a l'imctiott ol' operational task requirements:
5. !'o descril'|,: human t'act,:u.s r, rol',icms aud to discuss the extent to which these can be
examined in,.lcpcndcnlly of all other flight deck actisitics; and
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O. To discuss human performance assessment methods and the extent to which they are
relevant in terms of operational criteria such as system output.
Guidelines
Tile following guidelines define the itlternal constraints on the purpose, scope._de.tail,_and,
especially, the approach of this document:
I. A time frame is assumed that has constraints comparable to those existing in tile develop-
ment of a real system: for example, contractual, monetary, and end-item delivery.
2. An attempt is made to retain a system-orientation throughout: crew members are thus
treated as human subsystems in a system.
3. Human factors evaluation - performance assessment - refers to the relevance and eft'i-
ciency of the output of the human subsystem with.regard to system purposes and goals.
4. The ground rules, strategies, procedures, and isstles in behavioral, part-task laboratory
studies ,,.re obtainable elsewhere. As topics in this report they qualify only to the extent that they
contribute to and support the overall goal - human subsystem performance evaluation.
5. The context of system development and end-item delivery is not an appropriate context for
the development of human facto_ research technology, explicit human performance hypothesis
testing, or the pursuit of infinitely branching research questions regarding fundamental human
capal: ities.
6. The authors of this report are unaware of techniques for assessing complex performance
unless such techniques are available to the community at large.
7, Experimentzfl investigations in full-task situations contain all the probtcms involved in
part-task, laboratory situations: the converse is not true. To be inclusive, this report is concerned
with the former.
8. The t,.,man factors effort refers to assisting in detemfining design requirements anti
identifying : Ateria. Research requirements will proceed from the subsystem mission objectives
and constra:'_ts, functional analysis, and activity analysis for candidate integrated systems. Research
that may be r,a.uired is motivated by specific questions arising in the system engineering design
process.
O. A general human factors approach is outlined, illustrated by its application to a specific
subsystem - the cockpit alerting and warning subsystem.
10. The evaluation stratet.'y discussed is with reference to a CAWS that has been designed with
knowledge of the larger system context and of explicit operational requirements. This m.ans that
system optimization rather than system improvement is the guiding philosophy.
11. Only the more salient points in a wide body of related literature are included in this
report.
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HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES 1N COCKPIT ALERTING AND WARNING SYSTEMS
CAT-fi.GORIES OF WARNING SYSTEMS
There _re several ways that tile many kinds of alerting, warning, caution, and advisor)' displays
might be categorized. To some extent tile method chosen depends on tile purposes to which tile
categorization schcnlc is to be put. Since the purpose here is to clarify a seemingly disparate
collection of independent entities, a starting point is selected based on tile kinds of deviations that
make tile alerting signals necessa13'. Three general operational sources of aircraft deviations are:
t I/performance devi:|tions: (21 configurati,.m deviations; and (31 system deviations. Wit;tin each of
these classifications it is possible to further categorize the deviations in terms of the urgency with
which the deviation must be corrected.
t-ach of these categories will be discussed below. In each case examples will be cited using the
three major-wide-body aircraft: the Boeing 747. the Lockheed L-1011. and tile McDonnell-Douglas
I'K_-I0. A word of cal|tJon is in order. It is understood that many variations in :he specific
cmbodinlenl of even "'standardized" alerting and warning systems ma:: be found due to aircraft
evolution, user practices and procedures, and changing regulator3' rcquireulents. The sources of the
examples discussed below are rcferetlces _) - I I. Althottgh tile salidity of tile examples is limited to
the scope of the ret'erenccd docutuetits it is still sufficient for illustrative purposes. The B-747
operating manual is that of Pan American Airways. The other two mant|als were obtained froth the
airframe tlta|luf:lcttlrer and reflect operating procedures tlsett by several airlines.
Pertbrmancc Deviations
Performance deviations refer to aircraft departures from safe flight profiles. They have a high
level of urgency alld frequently require immediate action to correct ;! potentially Ilazardous
condition. They arc ttsuatl.v gnaled by ;m audio alert and. in conjunction with configuration
devialions I,discussed belowL are of prime importance in tile increasing problems associated with
cockpit ale rting and warning sSstems generally.
I-xatuples of this class ot" CAWS are: ground proxitnity warning system t(,PWSL altitude alert.
and excessive Math airspeed alerts. When the aircraft enters one of the five GPWS .,,amine
envelopes (excessive sink rate. terrain closure, descent during takeoff, not in landing configuration
below 500 ft ;there grottnd level, low on glide slope_ a "'Whoop. whoop, pullup!" message is
;_ctivated alld a warning light is flasllcd for the first four conditions. The "'whoop" is :1 swept tone.
the "'pullup'" is a synthetic voice. For the fifth mode, the synthetic voice iterates "'glide slope." The
t;PWS is Sl:lnd;ird oit ;fir transport aircraft.
The ft,llowing :|ltitud¢-ah:rt modes arc in conformance with FAR 01.51, dated August 31,
I o_ I. Iqlis rcgul:ttion was rewritten to clitnin.'lte the aural w:trnillg on i ! rt aching altitude, it was
Jilter'petaled oI1 S¢l_l¢lllbcr 2 |. ! O_7.
I. B-747: I1_ the c;IptUlX' nlode, a 2 .-_'¢ chord tune and ,i slcad._, amber light z:r¢ activated
tt)(,K'l ft t'ron_ the selected altitude. File at'abet light extinguishes at t300 I"1 frt-.Ir the selected
i°
altitude, in the deviation mode a 2-see aural sounds and the amber light flashes when _+300 ft is
exceeded. It continues flashing until -*900 ft is exceeded at which time the system autcnlatically
l-eSetS.
2. L-101 I: The L-1011 is similar to the B-747 using a C-chord tone and amber light for the
functions described.
3. DC-10: The DC-10 uses a 2-see dual air horn and an amber light for these functions.
The setting of the two bands bracketing tile selected altitude is a function of the airline choict so
will vary from carrier to carrier.
The overspeed alert warnings areas foUows:
!. B-747: The 747 uses a "clacker" for overspeed warning.
2. L-1011: The L-1011 uses a clacker sound.
3. I)C-10: The DC-10 uses a "'clucking sound" for the alerting fimction. This sound is also
used as the slats extended warning. Some aural warnings have a dual meaning and arc assigned to
functions in separated flight phases.
Configuration Deviations
These deviations differ from pertbrmance deviatio_is in that some positive action on tile part of
the crew has been omitted preceding a transition from one flight phase to another. The action
omitted is one that preconfigures the aerodynamic profile of the aircraft for controlled, safe flight
in the intended flight regime. ,_s with performance deviations, immediate remedial action is usually
required when configuration alerts activate. Examples include unsafe takeoff and landing configura-
tion and open doors.
Alerts for unsafe landing configuration are as follows:-
I. B-747: A steady horn is sounded when tile gear is not down and locked and any thrust Icy,::
is retarded to idle with flaps at I °, 5 °, l0 °. or 20 ° or the gear is not down and locked with flaps at
25 ° or 30 °. thrust levers in any position, in the first case, the horn can be silenced by activating, :he
warning horn cutout switch on the aft section of the center console. In the s_cond, it can o_,,.¢ be
silenced by pulling the aural warning circuit breaker, in both cases the horn is silenced by sei_:cting
tile correct configuration.
2. L-101 ! : A steady horn is sounded if tile gear is not locked, the flaps are not extended more
than 30 °. airspeed is less than 180 knots and any throttle is retarded more than 57 ° The horn
cannot be "punched out" when the first two conditions exist.
3. I)C-I 0: A _on, in'xous "car" horn sounds when thrust is retai'ded to idle and tile gear is not
down and locked and airspeed is less than 215 knots. Tile horn may be silenced by tile "horn off"
8
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button if the flaps are in an approach configuration 1<28.5°), If the flaps are extended beyond
28.5 ° Isay. 35 ° landing configuration) the horn can be silenced only by extending the gear.
Prior to flight, all aircraft doors must be closed for aerodynamic, environmental, engineering.
and safety reasons. An open door or a faulty door condition is usually indicated by amber lights.
Reference 2 gave the following numbers of un.,,afe door alelt lights for the three wide.body aircraft:
B-747.16 lights; L-101 I, 12 ,,,teady and one fla._,hing amber light; I)C-IO, 20 lights.
System D_viations
Aircraft systems and sttbsystetns are nutnerous, complex, and frequently redundant. Malfunc-
tions and faults in these many systems are usually signaled by needle positions, instrument sate
operating bands, flaW. and lights, it should be noted that the deviation of an instrument from a
nominal value or band is of itself a form of alarm but one that is not explicit as is the case with flags
and lights. As with other alerting signals there has been a st,eady proliferation of system deviation
warnings. The increase seems to be in response to and parallel with the concurrent growth in the
demands made on the crew by dividing their attention among the many functions involved in the
complex flight-management task.
Reference 2 shows that the B-747 has 37 bands, 65 flags, and 655 lights; the L-IO1 ! has 7.
152, and 039: the DC-10 has 110. 53, ,':nd 463, respectively. Most of these do not have a high
urgency level and frequently require only that :_n alternate subsystem be selected. However, if
engine fire may be included in this categor)' of deviations it is a notable exception, one in which the
urgency level is high and one that requires tam_ediate action. Because of the seriousness of on-board
tires, the fire warning/engine, wheel-welll is always accompanied by an aural alert. A stereotyped
sound, a bell, is used whose specific characteristics may vaq," somewhat (e.g., intermittent vs steady
ringing).
Finally. deviations can be indicated by controls and displays ;tot being activated: for example.
gear. flap. throttle, speedbrake, out of positio_l, and normal operation lights being extinguished
(blue. ffeen, white lights usually). And. to coml3;ele the set of deviation indicators, all cockpit
displays provide deviation signals. Reference 2 provides a full listing of the many ('AWS in curre;_t
aircraft and is an excellent source of data tlaat i,ave been cateeorizcd in several ways. The tl:ree
categories chosen above are for convenience only.
SINGLE ALERT LOGIC
For th,: ptlri:x_se of human factors analysis, CAWS can be fLirther conlpartmcntalized as ._#ng&'
alerting systems versus alerting s_stetns in the aggregate. A discussioi_ of the single alert directs one's
attention to the operational and fnnctJonal reqttirements Ih:lt underlie the it:strumented system. A
schematic diagram of the simplified alert respon._ logic is shown in figure I.
The primary purpose of an alerting and warning _ysleln is to direct the ;|ttenlion of the cre_ to
an impending or current system or sul_sy,_tcn| deviation. This kill,d of r,ignal i_ nece_,_ar._ l't*r two
main reasons: ( I I it i,_ not always po._siblc to fully inonitor aircraft :._ _tevl_. M_.IILI_,title If the vnan)
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Figure I,- Single alert responselogic.
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1;i,.'e1_ ut' tli}',ht IIt_tII;IF;_,'IlI¢111 _,l¢ttl;tl|t|ill_,'. +lttention, d¢,.'i_ion_, _lm.I cognilixe ;wli',iti¢,',,; _md (2) nl;mx
SLII'IS.VW,|_,'II| I';Itill._ ;11"_,' riO| I'e;It|ll% ;ll_l'J;it'ettt |'_)" I'L'f_,'l'¢ll_,'_,' tO Ihe disl'q;l_'.'.; I101'111;111V ;i_._o_,'i;lled %'.'ilh
I_l¢tll, Iml_li_'il in Ihe ;11ertin_'. I'Lltl,.'liOtl ;ll'e requirements to ,t/rrr, or C;tI'*iLIi'e the ;11I¢111io[I of the
,.'1"e'+_',_I_i t_ i_a_'iu'm 1111.'_,'r¢_' ,I._ t_ tht" ._I,11",,',., _I" |he _le_:i_Hio1'1.
XX'lt+It is 11oi so ;1|+p_ll'¢ttt is the possilq¢ l'eqUil'¢tllCltt th:tt the crcx_' [_c _ix¢u s_+111e <'_++tr<_l oI the
,_lel'lhlt; si!t11:+l U._'_'IP ol|tcr II;1111 I+)' _'t11"_,'_'1i_1_.the si,_m,d_'dd¢x'i+lliO+l, ,_11_'11i,_ _lh¢:lJy the ¢+1s¢ with
.',;+++t11¢ ,ll¢ltS. l:or e_,:llltl+le, lhe l;ttlt[itl,,_ _.t¢;ll" X'+';It'11itt£ hotIt ¢;In I_.' "l+un_'hed OIll" tltld_'l' ._Ollle
_.'Oltdilit+It._ ;111d lll;l._|¢r _,';lllti_It lights _.'+I111_¢ t'¢st'l, ._o111+.' while _111;lllll+_.'l', l,lbelcd li_llt 1"¢I1111i11_Oll
until th¢ d¢x'iation is _'_+r1"¢¢teJ |the _'+lus¢s of +yst¢111 dcviilliOllS +It'_' trot _ICtUi111y _'Oi'l'¢_'tcd, rilther,
:111:llI-'1'n+ll,,' ,,,;.x_+t_'ttl|st" ._xste111 _'_1111'iF1111"_11it111i_ ._¢l_'_'tt'd).
111 t'i,_11i'e I, the siFtnit'i_'+Inl ¢x'etIts r¢l_Ite_! to the ot;sel _+I"11 si1'It.P,l¢Jex'i+ilion +It+J +ll¢t't and 1h¢
,tsso_'i,11eJ 1"eSpOllS¢ lo+ti_ • :it,,' .shown in ._,'hcm,iIic l\+1'rn. I'_'¢n1_ l+t'xt+1111 jun_'liou _._I hl t'i+tu1"¢ I :u'¢
+isso,.'i,11ed <i1cuiI1.x is of iIH_01'e._t here only Io lhr _,'_lenl lh_II it it_ix' i111111,.'11_,'¢mi11'_s_,'tlt_+,'111h11111111_I
i+¢1't'_+r111:tn,-e f_I\+1' in_I:it1_'¢, .i1111_'Iit111(._11. l, lnce il i.,+ ,i_t+111_,_I th:11 the :11crtin,_,, s_+t11:11tlhe :ll'irml 11_i._
b¢¢n _1_'lix+11ed, the hiput l+ou_Id:iry _;I" lhe _,'.AIY_ t_1,sk _'_111he dis_'¢1'ned. 111o1'Jer to e,_I:lhlish c1"iteri_1
|'or hu11111n l+¢rfornl;In_'+, " eX':lh1+IIiOn+ il is 11e_'¢,s,_11'_.to u1+ik¢ ¢\plicil |he t+Isk l+o1111d_1"ies l+y 1'¢I'¢ren_'_"
Io sy.sleln 11111<lion ,mr/ t:1+k tlcn1,1nd,_ [+oth l+y ,111_11"_I_'1io11,:IS here, ,Ind. ulti111+itely, hl ,.'o111e_l, :Is
e111i+¢dded hl 11i_ht-n1,1n+1+',¢t11¢nt ,if'fix|tics. +
111iutt_'fiOlt 1,41 +111,|let"ling ._i+.,,n:tl nl;ly ._o tlnl+et'_,'eixeJ for _i x':iriety oI* t'c;l._t+n._, not the legist of
whi_h i._ ;i condili<meJ r¢sl+t+1+s¢ h' i,_'.11_11it' _111 _iIt'I"1 th,II i._ '1_'tix,iIed I'reqlle111|y _1111| i,_ o11|y
condition+lily i111"_sH11iltiv¢ t_11titude _11¢r11. IYo1"kloiid +ind di_isi_m oI" _ille111it_11 _Ii'¢ ,,+trong inllu¢11_'es
,u ,ill .ilmeti_1_s. If the ,11eI"1 is 11oi peb,'cix'¢_,|, _i misse,I ale|'| t_111,',_11_c tA_ i;_ i'i+z. 11--enmle.s. It" it is
p¢1u,'ixed, ,i x,11idity che,'k Liunction _,_I) _1111x"be in _11J¢I'. It" the _11e1"ti_ 11oI X_llid there 11111yor 11111x
11_+I be :I teSpOllS¢ t_+ it l,.iun_'tion (,')11. It" there is _i r,,'sponse, it is _1 t,ils¢ response _111_.IottI,,'_+me I,(,'I
O_.'_.'111.'_.Both the 111i._etl :llcrt t.._1:111d the I';I[,_¢ t'_,'_l+onm.' I,('_ i.%111l¢.'It| 1_+m.xs'.eln st_it_,' _'ontitIp, ct1_'i¢._.
It" th¢ ,11¢rl is not x,11idthe 1,11._e:11e1t _'tm_'lush+n _I;11 is _I ct_I"i¢_'I i'¢sI_O11,_'.
l'ller_, ;11'e .sexe1'+ll XV,lym i11 x_Iti+'ll t';llse 111111'nIs11111,xl+e tt'it_t¢1'¢d. O11e is simply t,lih11"e t11"t+ne or
inoi¢ ¢I¢n1¢nI,_ hl |he s¢nsh1+t-+11¢rli11,_ loop. ,.%tlothcr i._ |he lri,_,tt¢ring oI'11 inolnenl;iry +lle1't i11 1;1_Iki11F:
e\tcrn;11 or itlte1_t,11 _'out'i_,ut',11ion cl1_m_e.s. :_ thirJ i,s _111¢ to 1h¢ l_l_'k of" 111i._sio11 ph_1,_e-:Id_Ipli_'c
cockpit :llet'lin,_ ,lUJ sx;it'nitlg sy,_letllS; for it1._hlnce, _I ge;ir w:1rllin,_ horn duriult t+tller thml 1|It"
+_l_l,rt++1_'ll pl1,l,s¢..._n_,+lh¢1 + so111_'¢ _+l' "'I'_iI,_¢'" ,ik'rlin,_ ,si_m11,s is lh;11 due t_+ ,,+¢tling the scn,_ilixity
lh1esh_qd _I" the scusi11_ ,sy.stcm It_ Mw. :_s is _'eIl kurd,,,,'|1, the _Iet¢_'ti_m p1"_H_al_lity h_ :I si_,rml
delectit+1"+ sysI¢111 d¢I¢1"ulines how l,u'ge |he |"+|lit+ t+I l'e+11 h+ l'+11se _i_n+lls will l+e _11111this +,'1111l+e
I_reJetcrutmed, Some such p1t_:¢ss is inxolx¢J iu the altitude _tle1thlt_ _.xstctu in p1"_,'s_'Iti1_, th," 11_11_I
,|I_o,,'¢ :,nJ l,¢low sele_'teJ +111iI11Je within which re.P,., _ _,'_0 I"11 dexi+Itio|1.'_ will 11_,+I+¢ ._i_111fled. Where
the 11_111dis Io l+c preset _lel+e11Js ou |he x'+1111emJe¢111eJ Io I+¢ ,,+il,tlliI'i¢_itH in I¢1"nls t+l" 11s¢r ._ysIt'ul
l+e1l'or1111111ct' criI¢ri,1. Whlcr liluils t +._00 I'll wm_!J i11ci"ca,,+¢ lh¢ tlulnl+er tH' t11isseJ _iI_11nis, 11a1'rt+w_,r
limits t+ ._11 fll w_mhl iu_'1x,,ise the ut+it11+¢r _+I"l,llse _II_IrI'IS {11_+I¢ I11_It, iu |he l:IItCr ¢11._¢,I+Ik¢11 Io |he
e\lr¢llle, ihe _11Iilude _11¢1"lin+t sysh'lll coulJ be 11,_e_1_I,,, ,i pIvci:_io11 _tlliluJ¢ 11"_1¢kin_, system with
_IIltlilory l'ecdb_1_'k1_ I'h¢._¢ i¢111_11k,_ r_'l'Cl + I_ _lll _I_'_i_iIi_11 _+.'11si_is tl1_II 111_11iI_r conlinllOllS _'_11"i_ibles
_'1111111_Ih+ |_in,lry _:11i,11He,'+; I11_iI i,_, Io ,_11_'h_+,11'i_ibI¢s _is I¢111_ei'_i1111"_', a|lilu_h', ,'+ink i"_iIe, i11"¢,_._111e,hi11
11_I Io swiI_'h ch_s111"es, x_11_,,'s,eqUil_n1¢nf +z_-11oI,to sI,iIe_, siF_11_iIo.s._,elc.
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If tile signal is valid, a response occurs or it does not (junction (6), fig. I). If there is no
rcsp¢+nse it m;_.y have been ignored (jullction (l 0)) it1 which case event (E), missed response, occurs,
which is the identical outcome to an unperceived alert+ event (A). However, it may not have been
ignored but rather postponed to be given attention later (junction (l l)). Some alerts signal
continuously as long as the deviation persists - GPW$, stall warning, gear horn, alert lights. Others
are momentary - for example, altitude alert. Some, thus, have an innate "storase" t'unction, even if
it is only a panel light remaining on, but have varying degrees of attention-demand both initially and
subsequently.
If the alert is forgotten (junction (12)1 beyond a critical delay interval, event (1!), missed
n:sponse, occm_ and, again, the reasor: c,umot be determined by objective observation. If tile
postponed response is activated then its timeliness is a consideration. It may be delayed too long
because of a/,tivities in the "no immediate response" loop ((10), (IlL (121/ or it may be
accomplished too quickly as in too hasty engine shutdown. I:.ven if the response is not postponed
the timeliness of the response is a major consideration. Both the "too soon" and "'too late"
responses can result in overall system state changes.
If tile correct _esponsc has been selected in a timely manner (junction (8)1 event (F), a true
response occurs and the systet,_ contim_es toward its goal. The system state may be unaltered or
altered. Whether a crew member responds to an alert by correction of the deviation depends on
several thinb_:
I. The physical characteristics of the signal -- its alerting power
2. The urgency level of tlle deviation
3. The results of the validity check
4. Phase of tlight
5. Workload level
(_. Crew option
Figure 1 indicates, sinlplistically, continuation of tile deviation for an incorrect response, but
all incorrect response call also lead to new ,,' elations alld other thall ilorlllal oporatJotls. This is also
true of a correct response. The non-normal ,,perations shown in the "A/C System" box is arbitrary.
tneant only to refer to configtl=tions of v:|ryitlg criticality.
Figure I is meant to illustrate single-alert logic, llowever, the several single alerts in the case of
nmitiple alerts do noi take on a difl'eretlt logic. What happens then is that the rationale of
postponenwnt and the titueliness of tile responset: become more critical because of urgency levels
and optitnutll sequencing of deviation correction activities. A newly conceived CAWS nlight allocate
those functions to tile machine.
It should be recognized that the single-alert logic has been stripped to its bare essentials in
terms of human response. The development atld evalu,.'on of CAWS demands a detailed task
analysis describing the actions and interactions of tile crew over time in response to various and
conlbined alerting signals in concert with Oll-gOillg flight deck activities.
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Alerting the Crew
The prime functions of current alerting signals arc to capture tile attention of tile crew and to
direct that attention to a source of deviation so that appropriate action can be taken. To add to an
alerting signal coded information pertaining to the nature of the deviation is a design economy that
can be effective it" there are only a few alerting systems. However, there are so many, unstandard-
ized alerts in modern cockpits that the several meanings of coded aurals cannot be retained with
confidence, particularly by transitioning l',i[ots or under conditions of high workload or stress when
perceptual narrowing can occur. Perceptual narrowing is _ssociated with human performance under
high stress. Related phenomena under such conditions are atte,_tion fixation, reversion to wt.ll-
learned automatized responses, and reduced ability to accept new inputs. Perceptual narrowing may
be manifested in a sensory narrowing such as tunnel vision - a decreasing sensitivity to peripheral
visual stimuli and events. In the extreme, stress may produce a "white-knuckle freeze."
A great deal of attention has been given to determining how well an alerting signal can attract
tile attention of an observer. Tile kind of evaluation employed, however, has bee0. of sit_gle alerts in
experimental settings where other flight activities and busyness were usually only analogically or
inferentially represented. It is an assumption of this report that attempts to make current,
single-alerting systems better is not profitable. This is partly because to do so fosters a competition
between alerting systems with the most recent being the most attention-getting; moreover, the
emphasis tnay be tacitly placed on competition between alerting systems themselves rather than
between an alert and ongoing flight-management activities. The capture of the crew's attention
seems much more a matter of vying lbr a limited attention capacity and how well the alert does this
varies not so much as a function of alert stimulus parameters but as a function of the constantly
shifting human threshold of attention and arousal to the reception of new inputs, that is, new load.
Pilots state that some atmd alerts are not heard even though the sound levels (stimtdus intensity) are
usually set above qO dB (qO dB is about equal to the sound of a subway train at a distance of 20 ft
for the 75 to 1200 ltz frequency band (see ref. 12)). Reference ! 3 discusses tile current alerting and
warning system problem and, at one point, states:
it is clear that our present-day warning systems are inadequate and tmsatisfactory.
They may be further sophisticated by the addition of colors, horns, bells, and
buzzers, but in their present form they will never really become fully compatible
with the Iluman being in the cockpit, The time has come for a careful reevaluation
of our desi_,na philosophy.
There is a relatively large literature reporting the results of iluman performance m response to
warning signals where tile independent variables were stimuhts dimensions. For vision, stimulus
parameters are size, brightness, contrast, location, format, color, workload, vigilance, coding, and
subject age. For auditory sit,,nals they are frequency (bandwidth), intensity, location, background
noise, signal number and rate, and vigilance. Tactile signals may be of interest also but they would
seem to have limited application except for the universaUy used stick shaker stall warnitag.
Part-task simulation such as these laboratory evah|ations of single ;|lerting systems where the
system context (flight deck) is represented by simplistic analogs are not the major concern of this
report. Teclmiques for conducting these studies are well known and available to the human factors
practitioner. Their us_ in system development is most beneficial if the configuration of the
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developing system can bc more faithfully represented and tile task more clearly particularized (for a
full discussion of this point and related tttethodotogical considerations see ref. 14L
Specilic i_roblen_s related to the human response to the CAWS alerting t'unctio11 are the
tbllov.,itxg:
,\:uisancc-Aiertit_g signals are incrcasitlg itx 11umber as systems increase in complexity. These
are not ;111aural signals but the annoyance expressed by aircrew members is usually in response to
the intensity, inadvertent activation, frequency of activation, false alarn| rate, and intrusiveness of
the aurats (17 in the B-747, 15 in the L-1011, 15 in the DC-10'h The cosxscquences of this kind of
response tnay be nil in terms of criteria for the successful COlUpletion of flight phases and ulti.nate
system output, ltowever, reduction and simplification of CAWS for reasons more relevant to system
pertbrn_ance criteria would produce benefits even in tills area.
..tttcnti<,t alzd I"igilattct'- The alerting signal is supposed to be atl attention-getting device.
Under quiet cockpit conditions a singk" aural will probably accomplish that and the crew would not
be hard-pressed to attend to it. With flags and lights the state of vigilance of the crew wotfld be an
important tatter due to the need to visually scan the panels or to be actively engaged ill using a
dispkly upoll which ;I flag appeared or next to which ;i light came o11. Tht,s, the state of arousal or
vigilance level of the crew is important for signal detection where flight deck activity requirements
:|pproach quiescence. System and flight profile monitoring can I_ecolue overly relaxed and subtle
deviations missed, especially lion-aural signal:. On the other hand, tile intrusion of ;I loud aural alert
during, say, the perforlnance of a precision :a,_k requiring concentrated attention can have a
"'startle" effect; its efl\'ct on task perforlnance is not known but could be considerable,
At the other end of the task activity scale thigh workload) arousal may be high, but human
channel capacity I_econles ;I signiticaut factor. It is not necessary to posit the hutnan as a single
cham_el processor of il_l\wxn;stion to give this t'act credibility. Many behavioral studies have shown
the decrement in perforlnance related to task demand, particularly in the reception and processing
of inlbrlnation (see ref. 14'1. Tile filldings are that hun|arts are limited itl i11ptlt load processing, The
view t;lkcn here is 111;1t of Chiles _ret'. 1 5): "... the human operator is influenced by too gre;_t a
variety of factors to try to permanently settle the single channel hypothesis at this time."
At this elld of tile scale, high workload, the alerting signal competes for the attention of the
crew. A sigtlal 11o1 attended to ¢;111 llleall Ilia[ a decision has been nlade to poslpc_ne it or
wmporaril.v ignor,: it for reasons of priority of other OllgOillg activities. II could also ii11.';111that it
was nlissed that ix, ilot perceived. Tile ev;ihlation of ]lLltllall perfol'nlalwc ii1 ternls of whether or
how quickly the alerting signal was responded to c:mnot have relevance unless the condiIions tin:let
which the sig11;ll occuned are taken into a¢cotmt. Criterion performance in respoildiilg to ;_,1 engi:lc
fire warlling bell would inchldc a period of ;isscs,,,;lllell[ Of var.vilig duration dependent o11 "he
aircraft, flight:pha,c,e, and, pel;h;Ips, inulwdialely :1111eeedcn! events. Also, a decision (covei"t/ Io
p0stpoiw aerie11 on ;111alert cannot be ol_served and a n|iss,'d al;mn tbad pcrlbrl|lancel looks exactly
like a lX_Slpolled alal"tll tgood pertkwluanccl
The Nna13' i1;1Iii1¢ of the effect of workload Oll hunlan Iwrfornlance is reflected in tile
often-referred to, h.vpothetie;fl rel;Itionship b_,,lwccl_ workload level and perforn_allce. The relation-
ship is ilhlstr;itcd by :111idc,lli/e|l, invel"tO,d [1-shaped curve. :is in figure 2. ]'he inlportanl t'unetion:fl
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workload level and performance.
relationship shown is tile reduced performance for both low and high workloads, even though tile
internal behavioral ¢ol_tent is quite different ut_der the two couditiolls.
Whatever tile response outconle, tile response to the alerting signal is like many other flight
deck tasks: it is discrete and it is of low rectirrence rate. Unlike other flight dock tasks, it has an
unpredictable probability of occurrence. In any full-mission sinlulation - flight sinlulator or actual
aircraft - tile progranlmed occtll'Tetlee of this independent variable for reasons of experimental
strategy has an innate weakness. Tile alerting signals rise to tile attentional foreground and becollle
the focus of primary interest with high repetition rates, uncharacteristic of contingency events. This
may defeat tile purpose of tile evaluation. This is also a weakness of laborato_' studies of alerting
signals in which the full-task context is not represented except by atlalogy. Tile alertillg signals
occur by design rather than exigency alit, l are unrelated to crucial life circl.llllstances. Their results,
then, may be more germane to tile revelation of performance under lt)u' st:lies of vigilance and
arousal. Tile soporific behavior of lllally laboratory experimental subjects is all too frequently
obsem'ed.
Rcsptmse ('onditionitlg- hi December of 1072, an Fastern Airlines L-1011 flew into tile
ground 18 tniles northwest of Miami International Airport. Tile National Transportation Satk'ty
Board report of tile accident (rot'. I(_) contains, in a list of 17 Bo_trd findings, tile st:ttetuent that:
"Tile flight crew did not hear the aural :altitude alert which sounded ;is the aircraft descended
through 1,750 feet tll.S.l."
It is not knowtl, of cotlr:;c, whether the crew did not hear it. igtlOtx, d it. or postpotled action oi1
it. A real possibility, however, is thai tile psychological photlOtllenon of"rLsponsc cxlinction'" nlay
h:lv¢ been rcsponsil_lc for tile "lllisscd alert." A gr;Iphic description of the role of exlinlctiotl st:tted
t,
!
ill opcratiolla[ te:'llls is provided b)' the conllllullique to lhe NASA Aviatioll Safely Reportillg
S) slelli qtiotcd il; ({I._'l' (" ill lhe introdtiction above, Tile altitude alcrtiilg s)'steiil is ;i priillc ¢x;,illlple
of over-alel'lillg aiid the l_l'Odiiclioll of al;irln._ lhal, whilc nc)t sirictl) false, have olll)' occasional
value, I! is a conllnoil[) obsei'_cd facl ill le:irlling and in behavior lnodific;atiOll ihcor)' lh;ll
iiilreiliforced beh:i_,ior will cxlinguish. Resl_ondillg, to the allitude .'ilert freqtientl)' does i)ol have a
reillfol-Cillg v;iltic because ils titiliiy It) lhe iil,iiillen;lnce ofa dcsii'cd allilude is absellt.
Althc)tigh the crew has been trailled to respond to tile altitude alerl, oDerational experience
provides for a dccoilditioning or exlin/uishing of this response. Thi._ process is ret;irded oilly b)' the
crew's kllowlcd/e thai what they are being warned of iilay bc cataslrot_hic if :illowed to proceed. It
is ;ilso ct)inl_licaled b)' lhc evcr-Dleselll doiii_t ;ll)olil the lrllth (;1 critical air)tilde devialion has
occlirred or a critical allittide deviatioil has not occurred) of lhe alert.
Credibility is thu.s severel$ compromised tlllder these cireulllstailCeS. There may be ._cveral
consequences of this.
I. The e_liilctioll process is related te inn;tie hiinlan neural aiid cognitk'c processe:_ ;lild calinot
alwass be SilCCessl'tilly !llediatcd b)' rational l_rocesses.
2. The tendency Io cxtinctioll and lesseiled credibility i|lay gt'#l('#llll:t' to other aleriiiig
s)stenls and alerting philosot_hy, l)articu!arly _vher¢ deviation sensor thresholds are so low ;is lo
l'oster high false alarm rates.
lnt'ornli|L_ the Crew
A secolld ful_ctiol_ of the ak_rting system is to indicate to the crew the source of the dexiation
and, to some extent, tile urgency of lhe re,.luired corrective respo|_se. This triple cotli_lg taleriing,
iulbrmillg, assesshlgl has both advantages and disadvantages. The ad_'antages arc compactness,
econoln.v, alld some possible staudardizatiou. Tile disadvantage is that with _11_hlcreasing ntimber of
systcnls lhe rcquiremellt to relncnlber several differcni codes results in all increase in workload alld
a furlher sol|roe of llncerlainiy, pariicukwl.v Ibr crew |llembcr,_ in cockpits with which illc.v ;ire not
completely f_iiniiiar. A qiiote frolli the eXl_elienced test pilot-eilgiileer quoted above Iref. 13)
underscores this dis;idV;llll;igc:
In fact, we ;tiniest expect ;i pilot to denloiL_trale "'perfcc! pitch" hearing durinl_ his
niedic;ii. !!veil if lhis were the case, il is ,i very poor w;i)' Olll Io re[$' on lhis IllelllOr)'
IO #dl'#ll4#'.l' ;i failtlre, cspeci;llly when lhe l]i_ht is iil a crilieal l_hase. In ;idttilioil. an
especially loud, l_enetratiilg lloise lllay cause overreaclion and InOSl cerl:linlv wil!
inlerfcre with norillal mental processes. Also, there is ;i l)olenli;il risk of conl'usioll
CatlSCti b)- past expericilce on prc,,iotls air_rafl.
TIle most ubiquitous Ibrnl of coding is that el" position. Aniber or red _'arning lilhts _'an
list)ally be foulld positioned soillewhere close to or within the ciuslcr of displays ;uld coillrols for
the nillny aircraft subsyslelliS. Fl,'igs, of course, are iniegr;il wilh the illsl;rUillCltl for which the_ se_'e
as ;in alert that the iilstrllllleni ilseif or a SUl_porling :ilibs)'stClll h;is IllalfllliClioned. Malt) inslril-
IllelliS also have small anlber or red lights thai _iclivale when ;.ill Oller;llillg r;lllge is exceeded or nol
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attained. Tl_eir meaning is clear with regard to the result of a malfunction but not always to its
source Lthe specific subsystemL
Labels on these warning lights also describe the problem" tbr instance, "HYD.SYS, PRESS. 1,"
"'LOW QTY," "OVERHEAT," and "RESERVE VALVE." The urgency level is indicated by
universally accepted color codes: red lk+r the most critical warnings, yellow or amber for caution,
green lbr critical functions whose status is correct, and blue and white for advisotT and status
information (see FAR 25.1322).
A very natural coding scheme is that represented by the stick shaker stall wan_ing employed on
all jet air carriers in compliance with FAR 25.207. The stick shaker, a tactile stimulus, is the only
alerting system that not only alerts the pilot to an impending hazard - the stall - but does so i.1 a
way that simt|latcs the actual reaction of an aircraft as it approaches the stall condition. All aspects
of a complete alerting and warning system, tLas herein conceptualized) are in_rluded: the pilot is
alerted, he is informed of the problen*, and the way to alleviate the problem is even suggested in a
single non_'erbal stimulus. Some systems go further and activate a "'stick pusher" after a period of
uonrespoasivcucss by the pilot _c.g., Trident I aircraft).
Oue aspect of the codiug of iuformation is tile evolutiot_ of certain stereotyped attrals such as
the gear warning "horn," the fire "'bell," and some alerts that are aclfieving a level of standardiza-
tion through cerumen usage, such as the overspced clacker, the intermittent horn for unsafe takeoff
conliguration, and tl_c altitude alerting "'tone." These art' similar on the three wide-body aircraft
u_,d above as illustration. Where stercotyp.v has occurred, a strong connection has been wade
between the aural signal and the deviation source so that interpretation is immediate. The
dichotomy between these stereotyped aural alerts aud recent or future added aurals is particularly
significant when some future integrated system is contemplated.
The use of synthetic voice annunciation for the informing function Ilas already become a
reality with the inclusion of the GPWS into the alerting, and warnin_ systcnl aggregate. Voice
annunciation has brought with it ccrtait_ special problems il_ human l:actors. Also, some early
opcratiolaal shortcomings were rccogniled and resolved by modifications to the technical
specifications.
The GI'WS was reqt|ired in all air carriers by Deceml_er I, 1_75 in accordance with FAR
12t.3t_0. I lowcver, a petition was n'adc to provide relict" until Septenlber !, I t}7(_, due to the large
number of nuis:mcc (false1 alerts being generated in operational use. Apl_ropri_lte modilications
were lllade tO "'l'_llvelopes of ('ondititms" for warning ill Radio Technical COllinlissio!l for Aeronau-
tics (RTCA) ttoctHllent I){,)-i t_1 and a ilew doct|nlent isstlcd. 1)O-I {_I A, May 27. 107(, (see rcf ! 7).
These documents are rel\,renced in FAR 37.201, Tech||ical Standard Order O_2b as providing
minimunl perll_rnlance, environmental, and test i_roeedures rcqt|irenlents for ground proximity
warning glide-slope deviation alertin_ equipnlcnt.
The functional requircn_ents 1"o1"the (;PWS specify the following modes for alert activation:
I. l:.xcessivc descent rates
2. I-xcessive terrail_ closure rate
3. l'xccssivc sink after takeoff (up to 700 t'tl
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4. l'erraill clt_sure (`not in landiug cotlt'iguration)
5. l:xcessivc dowtlward deviatiotl frotu glide sloDe
Both an aural and visual sigt'tal are required. For modes 1,1/ through (41, the aural warning is to
be sv, cpt touc (,400 llz to SO0 tI// repeated once "who,_D. whoop" -- l\_llowed by the
s.wlthetically ;)nntmciatcd word "'pulh_l.).'" This is ilen_ted until lht, deviation is corrected. A
situulta,wous visual warning, a red l_ght clearly labeled GPWS, is to be i._.ctivated. For mode (5/, the
attral anutmciatit_ti is to be "glide sloDc." As tcrr:liu clearance decreases arid/or as the glidt,-slope
deviation increases, the repetition rl)te ;lild tile loudness of tilt" atlral, or both, are to be increased.
The r_.'quiremeuts i_r crew deactivation of the GPWS atmds make it clear that it is not desired
to facilitate this procedt|re. Modes (, I 1 through (,,#,_may bc deactivated by a cirt'uil breaker or by a
guarded sal\,ty-wired switch, lndek,clldent deactivation of mode (5') is to be possible with a crew
control separate frk)m tl_c above switch. This latter has t_eeu impletuet_tcd it_ the B-747, h.v pressing
the red pullul_ light on each pilot's panel. Automatic reactivation is required for a ,st|bst,qt|e|lt
appro:)ch. This aulomaticall.v resets in the B-747 GI)WS when the airplane is again flown above
i 000 ft above groutid levt,l (,AG kl.
There appears to be little question concerning the advisability or" tile GPWS for the prevention
of cotltrolled-flight-itlto-terraitl (CFIT) accidents. In fact, one veudor Ilas showtl data indicating a
decrease i_ CFIT accideuts tbr carrier. Part I _I :l _
.., .... operation tbr the period following the
mandatory GPWS requirement in the Unit,;d States fret', 18L
llowever, the (;PWS is a 12rst instance of the use of synthetic voice annunciatiot_ l't_r both
alerting and int\.)rming the crew about deviations, in this case l')ertbr|uanc_, devialions from safe
flight i_rofiles, it thus izltrottt|ces a host of problems itl l_s.vcholingtlistics -- for example, semantic
alld syutactic structttre, signal-to-t_oisc ratios, operational or pragulatic context, arid redtmdaucy --
;111of which require Sel"iO).lS consideration in the design of voice anmmciation systenls. If s,vnlhelic
voice is used, tht, nlessage sel thai can be drawl1 from beco|ues virtually infitlite and the itllk)t'ulitlg
Cut,orion iu CAWS cau bc e'_tl"elucly articulate with very high it_(\_tm:ltiot_ tr;tnst'er rates.
A t'tlndametltal qtiestio)l, or perllaps operational tltzatldar.v, is whether tile lllessage is to be
I?rescntcd ;is a11 iuq_erativc or au advisory. _)V[lcli prcsc_lted _ls a COlllnlalld "pullttl_'" rtilht,r thal_
;is all advisol'). "terr:lill '° the t:lcit asstl111I'ltioll is illadc thzlt IhQl'e exists a Sillglc aclion st')hltioll.
But ;_ high sink talc can result from ¢ilhe|" diving or ._inking. t,ach of which requires differetlt
retl_cdial techt_iqucs. Four of the five GI)WS ulodcs arc sigt_talcd by a "'pttllttp'" comnumd _vithottt
idetatificatio|_ a,_ to the source of the problem.
There is a ucw geucratk)u (;PWS in which the modes arc identified by tuorc al_prop|iate
iumtmciations iltld which it)dicate to the crew why the altitude gain has beel_ COlllnlanded
{StHidslr;_l_d Data Control, Inc.. MARK !! (,;I)WS_. The nt,w GPWS. based on operational eXl_eric|lce.
[lil,'i beeti lllodil'ied It') provide fewer IltliSallfe wartlitlgs, [otlger wartlitlg tilucs, I|lOre wartlill,)2_ I\_r
excessive dcsc¢llt jtt._t short of the rtlllWay, arid a wilrllillg I'tw descent below lllillilllUlll dcscel_t
;lllill, ltt¢ tMI)-'_I. Also. tile _ynlhelic voit,e now en).lnci;lleS st,Veil _,;ll'llillg,_. sin O|" WlliCh r¢l'cr I),1 lilt'
i'ca.",it')fi|'or I)tlllillg t_i'), I't_r ill,',;t:lfldC, "'terraill," "'too low gC_lt," _llltl "siuk rate." The COtltlllatld tO
"lattllttp'" i_ tt._ed otdy t\lr deeper i_etlcll'atiolis of the wartiillg eilvclt_Dc,_ _1" the several (;PWS luode._.
This .,_eColld-gelleratioll sS'MClll is _llle;Idv ill oi_el';lliOllzll tl,_c.
18
Reference 19 discusses tile linguistic variables in synthetic voice annunciation and the problem
of advisory versus command intbrmation; it also lists the independent variables and parameters that
must be controlled in any human factors research in electronic-voice-warning-system design. Tile
reader is urged to read that report as an adjunct to the material in this section.
Crew Option and Control
A third function related to cockpit alerting and warning systems is that of crew control once a
deviation has occurred. Similarly with the other two functions, the provision of crew control seems
to have been a matter of evolution and in,advertency rather than purposeful design. This is a natural
outcome given the already high workload environment of the flight deck and the desire not to add
to it. However, there are instances in which it may be desirable to have the opportunity to delay the
response to an alert for reasons that may not be determinate betbreh,tnd. The case cited above,
where the inability to silence the GPWS could have had disastrous results, is all example, although
the probability of it occurring is admittedly low.
The kind of option ref,.'rred to here is that of control over the alerting system itself rather than
that of deviation correction; that is, the inner loop in figure 3. This is not to say that the two loops
shown are independent of each other, only that the concern herein is not with deviation correction.
per se.
DEVIATION
Figure 3.- Single alert control loops.
One tbrm of control is to let tile crew deliberately postpone action on a deviation until a more
desirable time. Recognition of the disruptiw: effcct of inappropriate alerts has led to the concept of
the "phase adaptive" CAWS in which tile various alerts would be armed only tbr flight phases in
which they had meaning (see rcf. 13). For instance, the cabin altitude alert would be inhibited in
approach and landing as would all =derts unimportant tbr that phase. Punching out an alerting aural
is a form of postponed action, for example, the gear horn. under certain circumstances.
A major problem with storing an alert tbr future action is the loss of the imperative of the
original alerting signal. Also. the need to remember is an added load on the crew if no other display
of the deviation is available. Proposal,_ to code the alerts according to an urgency level scheme seem
to have this problem in nlitlti. For instance, a single-alerting aural could be used and the tlrgency
level could be related to frequency, loudness, or repetition rate. In this wa}' the crew would have
some discretion in reacting to the deviation, and possible disruption of important ongoing tasks
could be avoided.
Tile subject of crew control of the alerting and warning subsystem may be prenlaturc in that
('AW's ;trc H(_t trcatcti as. nor are Ihey ill fact. truc ,_ubsystctl_s. if alerting systems were regarded as
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subsystems, it might be possible to provide for such system capabilities as coherent and logical
prioritization, control functions, and alarm inhibits, through the use of a microprocessor. Moreover,
this may be achieved through the more general use of a microprocessor for the larger complex of
flight-management tas_<s.
ALERTING SYSTEMS IN THE AGGREGATE
To this point, the discussion has been mainly concerned with single alerting systems. However,
the major problems emerge with the proliferation of these systems, in varying forms, on the flight
deck. With each deviation identified as being worthy of a special alerting signal, a new flag or new
aural appears in the cockpit. In addition to gear horns and fire bells there are now buzzers, tones,
clackers, wailers, chimes, beepers, klaxons, gongs, cr;ckets, and, in the Concorde, something called a
"'cavalry charge" to signal autopilot disconnect. This listing itself is offensive to the ear and perhaps
conveys more ominous implications than is intended.
However, the collection of warning systems is a set of independent entities whose purposes are
identical but which have no unifying mechanism. That it may be desirable to provide some unity
and to conceive of the warning ystem array as an integral whole is becoming apparent within the
industry. Approaches to the problem are evolving that point to this eventuality.
CAWS as a Subsystem
Despite tile many problems associated with current cockpit alerting and warning systems, there
is reason tbr optimism. This optimism is based On the emergence within tile industry and user
organizations of unifying and simplifying design approaches and the readiness of the state-of-the-art
to accommodate integration of CAWS. This is in the direction of the attainment of true subsystem
status for what is now merely an aggregate of similar entities. (For an interesting viewpoint on the
tractability of the problem see ref. 20.)
A system, subsystem, or suprasystem has certain characteristics that distinguish it from a
collection of similar but unrelated components, it has a purpose to which all components are
subservient. Elements and components of a system interact with each other and with system output
in support of the purpose of the system. Systems interact with other systems and the interfaces
with other systems are environmental boundaries across which inputs and outputs are processed.
Systems may be modeled and conceptualized as information processing and signal generating
devices. Cockpit alerting and warning systems are, preeminently, information processors; as cur-
rently designed they have, in the aggregate, none of the other characteristics of systems listed above.
The integration of CAWS thus means the transformation of the aggregate into an ensemble - into a
true subsystem.
Indications in the trade and technical jotmmls, in the general aviation community, and in
hardware design are that in concept, at least, integration (and simplification) is near at hand. There
are. however, many Ibrms that an integrated subsystem could take, so the problem becomes one of
the design and evaluation of candidate ensembles.
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Master Warning S._,qems: Groupings
The three wide-bod.v aircraft cited in this report - the B-747, DC-10, and L-1011 - have
cockpit displays c:dled master warning or master _,arning/caution annunciator panels. They give
so-called "gross" indicatio1_s of s) stcm deviations which are signaled in more detail in locations nol
within the pilots' immedi:_te field of view" for instance, on the flight engineer's panel. The tlight
engineer may also ha_ e a similar sumnmry panel but displaying different subsystems. In addition, an
annunciator panel may be included at the latter station to provide a grouped status indication of the
many doors on these wide-body aircraft. Aura! _arni_lgs aze not used with these summary panels
but the warning hght may be tlashed to increase its attention-getting value.
Grouping of several critical subsystct:: warning indications in this fashion is a step in the
direction of alleviation of the general proliferation problem. In addition to proximal grouping, there
has been ml assessment and in:lusion of those subsystc:_ d_viations of higher urgency in terms of
system safe perlbrmance. These are steps t_ward fuller integration for advanced cockpits.
Integration Concepts
The widely recognized problems associated with CAWS proliferation have spawned some
functional design solt:tions that incorporate some of the principles of integrated subsystem design.
These proposals arise from an appreciation of tile problem and, more importantly, from a
recognition of the plethor;" of solutions available, given that a CAWS may bc completely revamped
and rcin,strumented using, fi_r example, visual or voice annunciation, priority coding, mission-phase-
adapted inhibits, and pilot option and control. This also assumes that a significant step forward will
be taken in flight-deck avionics, notably automatic data processing irt the manipulation and display
of information.
Reference 2 is a complete sttt','cy and analysis of cockpit alerting and warning systems. It
includes not onb, a ,:ompendium of current systems but, in a second volume (ref. 21_ provides an
extensive compilation and review of relevant human factors studies and guidelines. Also included is
a set of system design guidelinc_._Some of the major recommendations are:
I. Prioritization: Alerts would bc categorized at a function of criticality and flight phase. A
unique attdio, visual, or combination attdio-visual alerting method would be a,ssociated with each
priority level. The priorit.v system has four levels: _ 1_ emergene_ - requires immediate crew action:
(2/abnormal (cautioil)-- requires imn_ediate crew awareness arid corrective ac',ion: (3)a,h'isor3.' -
requires crew aware=_ess and ttta.l" require action; and (4) information - indicates system condition
but not necessarily as part of the integrated warning system.
2. Inhibits: The nttnlber and type of alerts active during critical phase_ of flight would be
limited.
3. Annunciation: An alphanumeric display would bc placed in front of _-ach pilot to identif.v
warning/caution type alerts. Aural alert_ would be kept to a nfininmm (less than lk_ur'L Voice
annut|ciatiotl would be preceded by an "attention getting" identifier.
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4. Coding: Recommendations are provided for position, color, size, and brightness coding of
visual alerts in terms of the priority scheme. Recommendations are also provided for the coding of
aural alerts in terms of number, intensity, and signal frequency.
The Society of Automotive Engineers S-7 committee for Flight Deck Handling Qualities
Standards for Transport Category Aircraft has been concerned with the problem of simplification of
CAWS. A set of design objectives is given in their proposed ARD-450D "Integrated Flight Deck
Alerting System," This propo_a! is in the tbrm of a functional specification and only its major
features are repeated here.
!. Attenson: A s#tgle aural ah'rt is recommended for tile three most critical urgency levels.
Their four urgency levels are those given in reference 21, above. The attenson is to be modulated to
correspond to a given urgency level (attenson: an attention-getting sound).
2. Discrete aural alerts: It is recotmizcd that some aural alerts are deeply stereotyped and may
be included in the integrated system as "'discretes" in addition to tl_e attenson. It is recommended
they be restricted to the highest urgency level and be limited to four in number.
3. Annunciation: A centrally located alplmnumeric display is recommended fcr the visual
display of the three highest urgency level deviations. Color coding may also be used to enhance
urgency recognitior_, Voice anntmciation is recommended to supplement the attenson and visual
display for the most urgent deviations, Some deviations of lesser urgency may also be selectively
signaled by voice annunciation.
4. Inhibits: Although the integrated system is to have provision for alert inhibits this
requirement is not given in d_'tail except that t,he urgency level of a given alert is to be v,tried a_ _
function of flight phase.
5. Pilot option and control: There are several statements in the SAE specification that indicate
a recognition of the need lbr pilot interaction with tire integrated subsystem:
a. "Warning. cautions, or advisories shall be automatically cleared from the system when
fault conditions no longer exist."
.I",."Capability to cancel signals for uncorrected faults and to recall such canceled signals
shall be provided,"
c. "'System test capability shall be provided that will give tire crew nraxi|ntm| confidence
with minimum activity and complexity."
d. "The att_'as_n ,_houht be s:_t-canccling for some alerts and manually cancellabic for
others."
e. "'Alphanumeric readouts shall be sell\'anceling for corrected faults."
f. "( ;,pability to cancel sig_als (on the alphanumeric display) for uncorrected faults shall ............
be provided."
"Capability to recall manually cancelled readouts shall be provided."
Since this specification details t'unetional requirements, specific human engineering require-
ments are not included. The design of vistlal and aural displays in terms of sudl ratters as size.
brightness, and intensity, are presumably specifiable trom data in reference 2 and in other human
engineering guideline documents.
The subject of selective or flight-phase-adapted-itlhibits is not fully developed in the above
guidelines. However. reference 13 treats this as a distinct issue and provides a rationale for a Phase
Adaptive lt'arning System - PAWS. This proposal centers on a switching logic module th;lt
determin',!sT"from inpu:s from selected sensors (airspeed. altitude), what v, arnings to present to the
crew and what to hold for ;a more propitious time. An example from referent-,-- 13"
A generator failure at 80 knots at takeoff will cause a red light signit)ing "'abort."
The principle is. of course, that below 100 knots you can stop at leisure for ¢1'¢1:1'
failure, take your time to ev_:iu:tte the urgency, and decide on either returning to the
ramp cr tai,:i,a_,: oft a_in. Bu: the same generator failure above 100 knots will be
"'held" by the switching logic until passin$1500 ft at which point it causes un amber
light.
It was learned in a personal communication with the author that PAWS is the subject of a
proposal for inst;fllation ilt an aircraft like the Fokker F-28. The decision is not yet final because an
attempt is being made to cooperate with other airframe manufacturers (other than Fokker-VFW
B.V.) in order to arrive at a standardized alerting system for the next generation of aircraft. Tile
name has been ehangetl to Ptlase Adapted Alerting System - PAAS.
Reference 22 describe:, the cockpit alerting and warning system objectives for the production
Conc_,rde aircraft. Several of its features coincide with design guidelines given above, such as alert
prioritization, the use of functional grouping in a master warning system, visual and aural coding,
and a design specification for the" CAWS signal to: _ ! I alert, _21 inform as to the deviation source:
and O) direct the ccew to appropriate corrective (control) action.
Reference -"3 describes the viewpoints of the Royal Dutch Airlines on CAWS design. In
reviewing that document one is impressed by the recurring themes of l'tm,:tional grouping, prioriti-
zation, llight-phase-ad:lpted-inhibits, the separation of the alerting function from the inlk_rming
function through voice and/or alphatlumeric display, it_dependent CAWS validity verificatiota, and
"dedicated" aurals for those alread,v accepted as a stereotype t,:.g., selcal and altitude alert).
"lhc abovc is only a sample of possible integration ideas. Each of the arroyo, however, is
distinguished b._ positive viewpoints and related to wha! :m intcgraled alerting and warning
subsystem ought to be and do. That tllese sut,.gested solutions are in cc,nsonance with a much wider
avi,_tion community is indicated by a recent report accomplished und_'r NASA t'ut_ding. Refer-
ence 24 is _m itidustt3" sttrvey of CAWS. it clearly reveals the universality of the opitltotl regarding
the seriousness of the problem, arid the tlced for itltcgratiotl, simplit'icatioll, arid s.vstetll-orJcilted
solutiotls along functional lines. The report is too extensive to paraphrase here but is recommended
reading for :m.vone interested in the prevailing opinions related to the m;tteri:fl in this section.
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METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS EVALUATION
The ma,ay difficulties involved in tile evalt_.tie_ of performance in complex task situations are
common to all flight-deck task elements. The present focus of interest is on CAWS because there is
widespread agreement tllat it is a distinct problem complex. The CAWS problem may have unique
aspects, but in terms of methods of system developntent and test, the procedures do not differ.
One example of tile way CAWS differs from other subsystem_ is that tile display has (usually)
no clearly related control. To close a loop, correct the deviation, and neutralize tile display may
require the completion of many emergency operating procedures, qlle performance associated with
the CAWS display is not the completion of the proc_.,tures, per se. As illustrated in figure I, the
important performance is related to decision processes antl to the initiation of corrective action in a
timely and accurate manner. "Iimely does not mean "right now"; timely only has meaning in terms
of system requirements and, definitely, under specified conditions.
This leads to a discussion of performance criteria. The purpose of tllis section is to deal with
the criterion problem from the systems engineering point of view. To that end a very brief
discussion of the system development process will be presented followed by some of the salient
aspects of system test and evaluation procedures.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: APPLICABILITY
In tile development of a complex man-machine system there is a definite starting point
provided by mission and operational requirements which a custo,ner (e.g., military, industrial,
commercial airline) has deemed necessary to one or more operations he wants to accomplish. These
operational requirements are the beginning and the end for tile design team - and a team is indeed
required. Tile requirements are functional statements specifying what the system must do and they
reflect reqtfirements related to criteria of success; for example, economy, efficiency, military
deterrence, profit, and safety, of the proposed system. A system cannot be designed unless the
purpose to which it is to be put is known at the outset. Later design effectiveness can only be
appraised in terms of these system requirements, not in terms of general desigta recommendations.
What is true lbr the total system is also true for subsystems. The latter will have operational
requirements enmnating from the parent system with which they interface and whose purpose they
must support.
All the steps taken in the system engineering design and development paradigm arc done in the
interest of objectivity, completeness, design relevancy and practicability, and. very importantly,
management planning and control. This paradigm is thus a grand sche,nc for establishing ground
rules and objectives for the design team in its prottress toward implementing the stated mission
objectives. Design experience alone does not automatically provide this progress nor ensure its
success.
Given tile operational requirements, the next general step is to transform them into functimml
requirem,:nts to meet the objectives. Functional requirements are conceived as jobs or tasks that are
critical to system objectives; this must be a complete catalog of functional elements. These
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uititltately niu'+t be stated in tertns of i+erl'ormance limits :lnd design constr:lhlts for use ill tu:lking
decisions at a later slagc. This is also a sta_e in which performance criteria begin to be enunciatcd.
both for man and machine and. more importantly their colnbination and contribution to system
otltput tx'rt'ormnnce. The i'tmctiot| an:tlysis moves+ in increasing detail, trom macrolew:ls to micro-
h:vels of analysis. The larger requirements are figuratively tom apart into elelllentary functional
particles but without their relatedness to each oth_:r and to the system and mission Objectives being
ignored.
With the functions (jobs and tasks1 identified, pertbrmance standards established, and design
criteria |'wo|'_osed, the synthesis process begins with tile initi:|l allocation of:ft|nctions to either man
or machine. This is the point at which tile hunum factors practitioner can make a most important
contribution to s._stctu design and oper-d_ility. This is not to say thai this is where he first appears;
he should have been involved from the starl.
The next step in system synthesis is that of deciding on design solutions. These are selected on
the basis of rt'h'rattC|' :l|ltl practicaliO'. The first involves perform:nice, tile second involves such
factors as cost, weight, size, and availability.
These steps are not accomplished in a serial order but interact with each other tllroughout tile
whole design process. Fhcre is an ongoirlg iterativc process which is required not so lnuch t\'Jr
expediency but because the requirements and product are integrally related. This is graphic:ally
illustrated in figure 4 (fig. 4 and nltlch of this discuss|oil are taken froln ref. 2_). Even so, system
devcloi_|nent and iutegration starts with lunctional dcscril_tion and cllds with design.
"1"o be most effective, hunl:|n factors i'_ersounel should be irtchtded ort tile design team and
itlvolved thrt_ughot|t the design process. !1 instead they arc asked to help solve a specific human
factors issue and then excused, tile solution may onlv collfoulld tile issue. This is too frequently the
re:tuner ill which s.vsteul-related human factors problems are deall with. There are several good
el|hi|cations on the nlcthods and prit|cil_lcs involved in the aPl'_licaliort of psychology in system
design and develo|'_menl 0"els. ,_, 14, 20 32_. These should be consulted for detailed discussion of
tho,_e I'_1"oced tll'¢ s.
b,
There are scv_,'l"al re:lsons for providing the above I;rief description t"" 'he eletnental aspects of
s._stem design. Fit',_t, it is a process with a great de:ll of i11tuitive appeal I'_t,.:rise of a technological
utility in addition to its very obviotls fiscal atltl nlanaget|lcnt utility. Note that the sehelncs
discu._sed at the end of the last .,_.'ction rel:ltillg to ('AWS itltegl'ation are sets of futlctional
i'equiretnenls. Tile sysletll reqtlirenlenls that spawned lhelll are inll'|licit in tile ex|'tet'icnee alld
expertise of their authors. Though not fortnally dclitwaled, as i._ rccolnnlcndcd ill syslenl dcvclop-
illellt procedures, illa|l.V o1" tile Ol_,.rational reqttil'etlletlts have beco111e well kllOWll It1 the COlllllltlll ......
ily of users, at least ili general.
A second reason for otttlining tile svstelll developilletlt process is to enil_hasi/e that tile
orientation of this rclx)rt :llld sul'_sCtlUCnl research Zllltl leeht_ology efl\_rls related to ('AWS is seell as
fully del_Cndcnl on that model. This ertdol_cn)cllt is ill the interest of and is ',ilal to _1closer working
relationship I',etwecn the private sector ;ind NASA/FAA Im|n:ln f:lctors activities. Thai il is vital
ellSIICS I'1"Olll |he Ileed I_r agreed tll'_Otl goals. IlleallS. illltl gl'Otllld rules.
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A third consideration is that there are crucial and fundanlent:d differences between tile
problem-solving research accomplished in the development of a system and the general hypothesis-
testing laboratory research in human lactors. The remainder of this section addresses this topic in
more detail lbr the purpose of providing solne guidelines for evaluating tile relevance of proposed
studies l-or system test or sy:_tem development support.
Finally, it should be made clear that the human factors effort is integral with but subordinate
to the larger eft*on in the development of a large technological system. A human factors effort
uad.,rtaken expressly to anticipate the configuration of _ new subsystem and one that might be
• i_l!shed outside ¢_f or precedent to an aetu:d development cycle wetdd still best be governed
: the :tt,, , :onsiderations.
TESTING FOR I)I:.SIGN DECISIONS
Tt:e function of human factors studies accomplished in the course of system ttevelopment is
solely that of providing a basis tk_r design decisions. They are only justified when ap0ropriate data
do not exist or exist in forms unsuitable for the purpose. There is a vast human factors literature
pertaining to Imman performance capal_ilities inman-machine related problems, ltowever, these are
sektom of help: they are frequently too general, tOM system specific, include too few i11dependent
{real-world) variables, and too often foc,ts on individual perl*ormance variables rather tl,an the
combined man-machine system variables.
In an examination of two volumes of the ttuman Factors Jottrnal, I qOS-lq67, Van Cott
estimated that about 25% of the reported research fell into a category called "'information or
principles directly applicable to one or a family of systems." Of these only about one-half or 12"; of
the total would "'... sec the light o1 day in terms of actu'd implenwnted applications" (quoted in
ref. 30, pp. 367--3f_8_. ilowever, what is not possible to estimate are tiiosc human factors
contributic_ns that are made alld not form:ally reported. They do contribute to system development
but are of Jnstlfficielll gencr+flit._ to xvat'ratlt a reporting of results. Sometimes the htllnan factors in
the development of a reals.vstem is masked by high-level security classifications in military or other
sensitive projects - as are the efl*orts of other technologists. Or. perhaps even more to the point is
Burrows conlment Iret'. 33/:
Our effective humatl factors practitioner, who is politically astute era_ugh _o arrange
for hilnsclf to be early enough in the progralulUe alld intlucntial enottgh to steer it
well. tends to disilppcar (e'_cept in the eyes of perceptive inallagenlcnl] the better he
is at the job.
The Ta._k Fidelity ('ontintmnl
One of tile ¢onlintling l_roblems in hutilan factors research is caused by the lack of differc:ltia-
lion between the pure research t_l" lhe laboratory a,t I lhal accomplished I'of purposes of dcci._ion-
making in work situations cnlgineering tesl alld evahnation. The ilaltnral dicliotomy of these
aspects of tcchnologi¢;ll iilvcstigalions i!, also t'otlghI.v tel'leered in the ;_.¢tivilic._ atld character of
govel'lllll¢lit research labor;llories _,¢l'_tl_ hlllllall I'aclol'S I'Draclilioll¢l'S ill the world of sy._lt'lll dcsigll
:lnd fabrication. The goals of the workers Oll the two sides of the dicholonl_ are qtfile different. }:or
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the laboratory researcher the goal of tile investigation is frequently a contribution to a body of
knowledge. To tile extent that tlwt is :lccomplished the results have an application, somewhere,
sometime. Tile results of the engineering study must contribute immediately to system design for a
given set of operational requirements.
The dichotomy is frequently pictured as a continuum with classical scientific investigations at
one extreme and the engineering studies at tile other. Knowles (reL 34) shows a "continuum of
researcl, studies" with "models" at one end and "'demonstrations" at the other. Obermayer (ref. 35)
shows a "'levels of abstraction" continuum will1 "math models" at one extreme and "real world" at
the other. Chapanis and Van Cott (ref. 31) picture a similarly bounded continuunl for the "test
fidelity" dimension.
Similarly, figure 5 is intended to convey tile characteristics associated with levels of complete-
ness of the task structure. Moving the arena of research in the directions indicated will enhance tile
prc_nce and visibility of the associated, listed attributes. At the top are listed units of behavior in
ascending order (from left to right) of inclusiveness, complexity, and operational relevance. A task
taxonomy would be the result of an eflbrt to relate manageable, measurable component behaviors
at the left of the figure to their complex combinations at the right. Measurement opportunities and
techniques become scarce to the right as the researcher includes more and more of the total task
context in the design d¢cisionmaking process. Note that the categories delineated are reasonable but
arbitrary, an inherent feature of classification ("your system is my subsystem").
The reason for including figure 5 is to provide a graphic model for assisting in classifying
proposed research in the course of and for the purpose of system deveiop|ncnt. There seems to be a
considerable fiizziness in the human factors community - not about how to proceed but where to
proceed. This is evident at all management levels and is manifested in the individual researcher's
tendency toward activities to the left end of the continuum, when hc has a choice, it seems that he
gravitates to that which most affirms the ideals and sources of reward inculcated in him by his
tbrmal classical training. But that is conjecture. What is important is that the usual contintmm is
more than just that; the extremes represent wholly different sets of purposes, criteria, methods, and
products. They are both necessary, are of high purr_se and value, and, at worst, can only be
charged with inappropriateness. The major difference is that the goals of the practitioner in the left
part of tile aretm arc conceptualization and understanding: those of the one in tile right are
empiricism and control.
Classical vs Engineering Studies
The fundamental differences between classical and engineering studies were explored by Finan
(tel 36). The differences arc stated as design options in formulating and conducting a research
study. They are quoted here in order to preserve the elegance of the original statements.
An initial option is taken at the stage of selecting and formulating the research
problem, in theoretical research, the problem is transposed into a more controllable
context, and the variables involved are translated into conceptualized dimensions. In
contrast, the prime requirement t't_r the results ft_r engineering research to bc
relevant to practical goals restricts this latter type of study to situations and
variables that closely siluulate the conq_lcx of operational couditions.
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A second option concerns tile use of analogies in research. Tile explanatory model of
theoretical inquiry is essentially a symbolic idealization of observations, while the
forecast formula of engineering psychology call be considered an empirical summary
of results. A related distinction is made between ralidiO, of theoretical research -
the correspondence between a concept and gemlane phenomena - and JMelio' of
engineering research - the degree of relationship between forecaster and criterial
terms required for a specified practical purpose.
A third option is taken with respect to the differential role of hypothesis. In
theoretical research, hypotheses arc explicitly linked to a model, and if experimen-
tally corroborated, make possible attribution of effect to cause. When employed in
engineering psychology, hypotheses may serve to suggest the content of forecaster
and criterial terms, and may, post hoc. be t:sed to interpret the observed relationship
between them. The hypothesis-testing and demonstration types of experiment
exemplify this contrast.
A fourth option is taken in dealing with tile problem of tile variability of observa-
tions. Causal attribution depends, in the ideal, on the possibility of rigorously
controlling all relevant experimental conditions other than the one manipulated.
Forecasting. however, depends ot_ representing with maximum fidelity whatever
sources of variability may operate within the criteriai situation. This is the important
difference between systematic and representative design,
A fifth option is taken in order to define units of analysis. In theoretical research,
units are selected for the purpose of demonstrating behavioral uniformities; in
engineering research, tile requirement is to define a unit that proves manageable for
producing or tbrecasting a particular operational system.
A sixth option is taken with reference to the criteria of acceptable inference.
Statistical hypothesis-testing is considered more appropriate to the demonstration of
model relationships, while statistical estimation techniques are deemed more suitable
for forecasting to a criterion. The appropriateness for engineering studies of the
conventional 0.05 probability level for acceptance of findings will subsequently be
questioned.
A seventh option is taken when the conclusions of the research study arc extended
to neW situations. In theoretical research, generalization proceeds by demottstrating
the extensibility of the model dimensions to the new conditions. Limited engineer-
ing generalizations can bc based on inference from populations and guessed inter-
class relationships.
A final option is taken in connection with utilization of research outcomes in
practical situations. Results obtained under the pure conditions of the laboratory
yield tll)._'._rat'tI,'edictitms which may have implications that are adaptable to opera-
tional systems. Engineering studies yield .lbrccasts wllich constitute :1 direct and
immediate basis for action.
3O
Criteria
Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary delhles :1 criterion as "a standard on which 'a
judgment may be made.'" A standard is defined as "something established by authority, custom, or
general consent as a model or example: criterion."
The criterion is essential to measurement that is done for a purpose. "And measuremenl can
take place without purpose in the absence of clear and relevant criteria. The definition of criteria
turns on the word "standard" which in turu is seen to be arbitrary in the selase that consensus is
involved in its definition. At the extreme of ultimate criteria, from which system operational
requirements ensue, a value system will be discernible that is related to such larger system
considerations as political, social, military, b,umanistic, or economic. However, criteria following
lower in the system hierarchy are generally not arbitrary but are constrained by the need to be
relevant to the judged system goals. Thus, criteria will range from valuelike statements ("an alerting
and warning system should be unobtrusive untd really needed") through relevant functional
statements ("the pilot response to the aural shou!d be timely and accurate without degradation of
ongoing tasks"1 to measurable attributes in the criteriai chain ("pilot response time to the GPWS
under x conditions should be y seconds: to an hydraulic failure under x conditions, it should be y
seconds").
Oper:_tional criteria are already available by taking note of the generally agreed upon com-
plaints with current CAWS: there are too many; they are disruptive: there are too many false and/or
needless alarms: it is difficult to remember deviations associated with aurals: they are not standard-
ized (even functionally/within or between aircraft: they are not phase adaptive: they are too loud-
they can be missed (lights): there are only _oss indications of priority and urgency. Criteria Ibr tl_.e
design of a new CAWS subsystem would be tile obvious inverse of these. The current CAWS may be
considered to have been exposed to "operational test and evaluation" and the results- user
judgment - are being "tabulated" in the literature and in anecdotes. This appears to be one area of
cockpit design that has been. and is being, given considerable attention by users and has yielded not
only a wealth of criticism but a wealth of design criteria. The unanimity of opinion as expressed in
emerging functional requirements is unlike other problem areas in cockpit design (e.g., display
integration, tlUD).
It might be SUpl_osed tllat the crew reports require validation in terms of bchar/oral criteria.
That may sometimes be so, but it should not stand in the way of identifying and utilizing
p,w('hoh)gicai criteria that relk,r to crew satisl'actiotl with cockpit equipment and procedures. These
tatter criteria cannot be iguored in design by a slavish adherence to the principle that mau-machine
system (MMS) output (measurable) is all that counts, l)issatistklction with (even approaching
hostility toward) job design, and the tools to do it. when interl_lcing with desynchroilosis, fatigue,
high workload, and keenly fell responsibility can lead to errors in judgment or tO aclJOllS that
terminate in accidents for which t here is usually only a tentatively identified cause.
There is such a paucity of measurable or clearly defined and relewmt criteria for the cvah,ation
of MMS pertbrmance generally that the subject requires much broader and incisive treatmen, than
can be given here. in CAWS the problem is made even more difficult by the lack of regul:lrly
recurring behavior and its predominantly covert nature (see fig. I, decisionmaking, alert v:didity
checking, etc.). However. the scionlion of criteria; or the perception that none exist, for a given
purpose requires a firm grotmding ill the meaning alld function of criteria in MMS devcloptllenl _tntl
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evalu:,tion. Tile reader is referred to references 20, 27. 31, 34 -40 for advice and is offered tile
admonition that criteria must Ix" selected based on relevancy, efficiency, definitiveness, aud
measurability. These standards for criteria will hold for any systems, but the actual criteria selected
lbr use will, in general, be different for each system.
If it is agreed that the outlines of the s.vstcm development process sketched above describe the
"ball park." then criteria selection is the/"ball game." The selection of suitable quantitative and
qualitative criteria is crucml. Unfortunately, in view of the large element of indeterminacy, it
appears to be largely a creative process withot,t ftmnal guidelines.
KINDS OF TESTS IN SYSTt-I_t I)EVI-LOPMENT
One of the fund:mxental dift\'rences between classical and system engineering studies not made
explicit by the eight options given by Finan t.ref. 30"1 above, is the etiology of the probl(,m that
requires evaluation or controlled study. This has to do wi,h where and when to revert to studies to
solve design problems. The system development process cannot be delayed by these activities so
COIlS|r:lilltS caxl bOCOllle sev0re. Tile reXllarks Jxl this sectioll rol\'r to lhal COXlleX_[ atld XlOt to
investigative activities carried out by htn_an factol,'s personnel employed by the system developer in
anticipation of the He.vt system to be processed.
htost human factors research reports are addressed to systems that will bc developed later.
Generally. the classic:d researcher "'comes out el"" a body of knowledge (behavioral) to an
application in broad terms _.MMS't and wishes to make a contribution to the technology for that
knowledge. A t_roblem is defined that pl:|ces a ll|axl, machine, and task in controllable proximity
axld a study is accomplished. The goal is to report findings that will have sufficient generality so as
to be broadly applicable, in this sense, "'basic" research can promise more "'applicability" than
"applied" research. This is a worthwhile endeavor axld is necessao' to the growth and stxstexl:lnce of
the htxxnat_ factors technological base. It is usually tact of milch use to the system designer, however.
in thai it frequently is not in a form he can use Icontint|ous or exlrapolable.1, tlis design problem is
simik|r Io yet different frolll the siudy-task co|lfiguraliotl that was severely tl'tXxlcated ix1 the interest,
lW,:essarily, of experimental control. This research is generally ch;ir:lcteri/ed as a solution It_oking
l\,r a problem.
On the other halld, studies accomplished ix_ support of sx stem tleveh_pmenl are. or shotlld be.
exactly that. Axlticipation is, of colxrs¢, a desired attribtxt¢ of this slq_pol'l alld shotlld bc cxcrcisetl.
h_ fact, anti¢ip:ltiOl_ is already apparent with respect to CAWS, as witness the development of
functional reqtxil"elnents alhxded to abcwc. Ih't_blenls whi¢h arise in the developlllenl of a s.vslexn
come fronl the treed Ibr the resolutioll of desigt_ decisiotls. Specific soltttions are sotxght to specific
problems right away. The problems are not hypothesi/ed but surface as llodcs of I'ealit.x in the
SVS|eXll devolopXlleXl| px'occss.
RccogxlJlJoxl of lhe chx'oxlology :Hid sotxrce o1" hlxtnaxl I'aclol.X isstleS x'¢tlllJrillg attention has led
• t
to stlggt'slct, lestJllg paradigxlls for 1110 praclilioxler which are l:xiloied Io lho larger syslellx dcveloi_-
Illent Icslixlg paradigm. One stleh lesling paradignl ix thai offt'xed b.x ,'¢,hapero and Frieksoll irel'. 4 i }
and included in rcl'erences 2 t) aild 42. l'hesc authors divided s.vstem Iesting arid evaluation ilxlo
exploralox'y, resolution, arid verification.
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Exploratory
This level and class of test would normally occur early in system design and would be
motivated by problems arising in the course of "roughing" in the broad outlines of the hardware in
response to functional requirements. Also, these tests provide information where none exist in the
records of previous research. Because of the tentativeness of hardware configurations the most
opportunity exists for manipulation and control of variables so this level of testing resembles
traditional laborato_' research. This is g_,'nerally tile stage in which decisions about allocation of
lk|nctions car, be empirically validated. Fur instance, does it appear to have been a good decision to
have the avionics Io_c determine priorities l\_r queuing multiple alarms or should they be displayed
as they occur ehronolo_eally and let tile crew make the decisions? Questions of this sort '.,re typical
of the "newer" generation of ht|mall factors issues occasioned by the trend toward digital avionics
and at|tomatio|l and the apparently chan_ng role of crew members into one of inlbrmation
processors, resource managers, and tlecisioxlnaakers as against controllers (ref. 43J. These changes
are related to changes in the evolving national aviation system and it would appear that important
decisions concerning the allocation of n|an-machine functions arc in the offing. This will probably
require extensive use of the exploratory teclmiquc involving, as it does. probing of limits and ranges
and tile clarification of roles and performance requirements for both man :rod system. Of impor-
tance here is the considen|tion of the integrating of a newly conceived CAWS subsystem into a
higher level subsystem supporting all l'light management tasks.
Resolution
While exploratoD' testing is not tied spccificall.v to tile system under development, resolution
testing is. The purpose of resolution testing is dloosing from amotlg two or more camdidate
configurations. Although the level of the statistical significant0 of the difference between mean
p_'rlbrtmmce values may 1'_,*the most appealing criterion on which to base a decision, it should be
regarded in view of the qualification. "other things being equal." Other things being equal, Ill,:
choice can be based on statistical criteria; but such factors as costs, space requirements, reliabilities,
weight, pilot acceptance, and development time are seldom equal. This is true because this kind of
evaluation simply seeks to predict which configuration will result in :1 more effective system when
ineasured against selected mission criteria variables. Resolution testing begins in look like system
testing becau._' it may involve oper:ltional configuratiollS. Thi:_ class of testing also resenlbles
conventional research ill its control of variables for cotnp:lrabilit.v of testing l\_r tile several systetllS
under consideration. Also, the side-by-side co|up;|rison afl\srds lhe opportunity Ik_r pert\_rmancc
contrasts.
Verification
Verification tests usually occt|r later ill system devclopme|lt alld are related In tile question ot
wllether tile fully COlUl_sed system _ltist'ics t'u|lctional pertbr|uancc criteria, that is. operational
criteria, llowcver, the fitting of l_erl'ormance to Ol'|eralionaJ reqt|ire|uents is the prime goal from the
beginning in systcul dcvclopulent so tile underl.ving ralionale for veril'ication tesling is :lls_: present
throughout. Because a standard or "absohlte criteria" is used, all results have altl either-or cast :lnd
require critical analyses. CJlallg_,'s tO a cotnpletel.v COlffigured s.vstelu C_ln be costly :1lid t-'in seriot,slv
delay i)rodtlcl delivery. I)ccision criteria nlllsl I've clear ;llld compelling. The extreme of Illis le, cl of
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testingin termsof the developmentcyclewould be, in the case of an aircraft, fligllt testing
including subsystem verification.
These three categories of tests - exploratory, resolution, and verification - are not mutually
exclusive in terms of either chronolog,/ or tactics. They may be used and reused in the general
process of iteration. Table I from reference 41 lists the major-differences between the test types.
TABLE I.-MAJOR DIFFERENCES AMONG TEST TYPES
Characteristics
Typically performed in
Control of independent
vai'iables
Number of measures
recorded
Repeatability of test
conditions
Number of conditions
compared
Control over lest
OllVironnlen[
Number of det_udent
variables
Factors initiating test
Part,'s)stem teslitlg
lcsonlblalie¢ to
of rat ion a l
¢otlditions
Types of tests
i_xploratory --
Predesign and early
development
Hit.d,
Few
High
Any _easonable
number (e.g..
factorial desi_uO
Hig_
F¢'_
Ambiguity of
syslenl
P_rt
ko w
Resolution
Early development
Moderate
Few to many
lnlermediate
Few (sross configu-
ration
differences}
Moderate
Few to many
Need for design
decision
Part It) sllbsyslenl
Moderate to high
Verification
Throughout
development
Low
Many
Low
One (comparison with
perfornlanee standard)
Low
Many
Need to verify system
adequac.v
Stlbsyslein to system
Iligh
(Reproduced couries_ of John Wiley & Sons. New York3
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THE TOTAL SYSTEM
What has been said so far in support of an orderly (system engineering) approach to design,
synthesis, and evaluation needs to be extended Io the bounds det]ned by the National Aviation
System (NAS). The system called CAWS is a subsystem of the aircraft system which is a subsystem
of tile commercial system which is a subsystem of other subsystems. Previously, human factors
work has tended to emphasize the more tightly coupled man-nlachine activities such as tracking
performance, control/display relationship, workplace design, accuracy and time in task perfor-
mance. This, with increased engineering excellence, has led to better cockpit design and to a general
reduction of interest in problems associated with performance at the level of "'inner loop" control.
However, the emphasis is now shifting to "outer loop" activities variously called flight
management, resource management, monitoring activity, etc. This relates to the crew members as
decisionmakers, in an enormously complex intormation processing, utility assessment, at_d even,
social system. But the major underlying human factors issue has not really changed from the time
the first instrument was installed in an aircraft to complement the pilot's sensory and control
capabilities.
An Old Problem. a New Scenario
The problem is one of transforming the real-world spatial orientation of the aircraft - position
and rate of change of position - into a veridical human percept, where such a percept cannot be
accomplished by "natural" means, that is, directly or visually. This is traditionally accomplished by
fragmentating the inlbrmation into numerical indices of the various flight parameters and displaying
them to the pilot; no one of these is suft_cient by itself, The task of tl_e pilot-controller is to
integrate these fragments into an operationally useful percept of his constantly changing spatial
orientation. With appropriate training, humans are adequate for this task. However, this perfor-
mance is extremely susceptible to degradation under condi!ions of high workload, dMded atten-
tion, and low levels of arousal for monitoring system states. This refers not just to misreading
instruments -- the documcntatio,1 relating to misread altimeters is voluminous - but to combining
that inlbrmation with all other system information for the formation of a valid and continuously
updated vi.'ridical percept. Visual illusions which occur during the transition from head-down
(instrument) to llcad-up (visual) flight reference would seem to be at least partly duc to tile
discrepancy between the syptthesi:ed cognitive percept and the revealed risual percept, particularl.v
since a l_ercept is unitary, will not bc formed unless it is believed, and tends to persist.
in attacks on this problem there have been attempts to present information relating to spatial
orientation in "'contact analog" form. The attitude indicator is a mechanical analog for displaying
inertial space and the aircraft's rotational orientation therein. Many schemes have been advanced
using cathode-ra.v tubes (CRT) and transparent, flat plate CRT's izl the wind screen position t'or
displaying information in analog form - "'highway in the sky'" -- which would also conform to tile
real visual world at breakout. Conformal type information (scc rclg. 44 and 45) is also being
included in proposed formats for head-up display_ (IlUD). A recent development for study is that
s.vnthesizcd by I:laty(rcl, 46) lot a head-down display, it is c:dlcd a coordinated cockpit display
(CCD) and it was designed by reference to perceptual and httman factors research over the lasl
25 years related to spatial orientation and localization. Also, the de._ign was guided by the
b
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operational requirements of an air traffic control system. It is generic in nature and uses three
CRT's for the presentation of three orthugonal projections of the aircraft situation: perpendicular
to the forward line of si_lt, parallel to tile ground, and perpt:ndicular to those two. The latter is
thus a side view.._is provides a pictoriai altitude profile, heretofore not available in the cockpit.
(Would a GPWS be required if such a vivid aititutie record were available?_. This effort is oriented in
a philosophy of integrating the information in inner loop control (aircraft subsystem_ with that of
ot|ter loops, the air transportation system context.
System l,_duced Errors
Underscorin_ the necessity to consider hunmn filctors issues in tile broader system context is a
paper b.v Wiener. titled "Controlled Flight into Terrain Accidents: System Induced Errors"
_ref. 47). It is noteworthy that the "'system" referred to is not the aircraft or its subsystems, but
rather. "'... a complex air traffic control system with ample opportunities for system-induced
errors." The author further states:
The human factors profession has Ion,,.,. recognized the concept of design-induced
errors. This paper simply extends the concept to a large-scale system, whose
principal components are vehicles, traft_,c control, and terminals. These three ¢omlx3-
nents are efl_bcddcd in two other components: regulations and weather.
The contradiction suggested by the title is not really that. but is more indicative ofa lailtut of
tire integration of the two leve;s of system management being discussed: aircraft control (inner
loop) and aircraft managenlcnt (outer loop). The author cites several examples of system-induced
errors. Two of these (ref. 16 cited previously and ref. 48) are of particular interest because they
involve the altitude alert. In one of these controlled-tlight-into-terrain accidents the altitude alert
sounded I rain 34.5 see before impact: in the second. I rain and 17 sec before impact. In the first
case it was ig|lorcd: in the sc,.ond it was silenced by one of the crew.
The impotency of the alerting system is thus reflected ira two ways neither of which response is
seen to have any relationship to the physical attributes of the stimultls except, perhaps, its ability to
annoy, Wiener _ref. 47) has this to say:
All appealing tllough perhaps som,:what simplistic answer to vigilance and attentiot_
problems is to install warning dc_iccs which are assttmed to be attention demanding.
One must recognize these from the outset for what they are: one form of ser,.;ory
stimulation replacing or simpliJ_ving another, and t11¢ cxten_ to which they are u._ful
is determined primarily by their novelty. There is ltcrer a grtantttlet' that apt.Y
stimtthls, regardless o.t" its p._)'c'hoh_,_ical dimensions will ht, c_Jrre_'tl.t' attended to.
"'ct_rrectl_"" because one of the usual ways of dealing with warning devices, particu-
larly in the auditory mode, is to shut thetn off lemphasis oursL
Obviously. for an _,lerl to be effective, credibility must bc high. if it is not. then even when it !s
valid but does not agree with the crew's incorrect perception of the situation it will bc deemed
inv;alid by deduction from false premises. II is thus. tragically, tt_o late in tern_s of contributing to
the l'ornlation ofa vcridical percept.
I¢
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At the national level, a recogmtion and concern with system-induced errors, as defined by
Wiener, is reflected in reference 49. which is a congressional subcommittee report on the needs and
opportunities of the air traffic control system. It is recommended reading for gaining an apprecia-
tion of the total system concept.
A System Information Processing Model
A fruitful model of the total operational system would be an informat;on processing one. This
would afford a common and germane set of standards within which to establish system performance
criteria. It would provide the needed integrity for bringing together subsystems for the support of
the larger system purposes and goals. In talklng about workload we are not usually referring to
physical work but to cognitive effort in the acquisition and processing of information. Diversion of
attention usually refers to attending to several sources of information in close temporal sequence.
Monitoring has to do with clear and ongoing attention - right now and into a reasonably extended
future - to inlbrmation available in the system concerning the aircraft subsystem. Decisionmaking
is a process of weighing information and deciding on a course of action tempered by utility and
cost. All of these human performance aspcc:__ _-_"information processing can be critically influenced
by stress, high workload, fatigue, desynchronosis, psychological and physiological states, etc.
However, their degree of inl!uence could be assessed in terms of criteria related to information
processing activities and ultimately to suprasystem processes.
A good example of a descriptive information processing model is given in reference 50. In that
report a method is given for the study of haman factors in aircraft operations. It co._sists of
describing categories of information sources in the aviation system and how this is utilized by
people in the system according to a brief taxonomy of behavioral functions - decisionmaking and
decision implementation. The model and method are for the purpose of analyzing system activities
for the identification of "human errors." The authors recognize the limitations of that term and
state: "'... the investigator might well reason: that what appeared to be an obvious 'pilot error' was,
in fact, a sy)tem problem which led the pilot to an incorrect deci.sion, and therefore, an incorrect
course of action" (emphasis ours).
The approach and method proposed by these authors would appear to start analysis at tile
total system level- from the top down. as it were. This provides a governing framework that
permeates all task structures in the system, in this model, cockpit alerting and warning systems
would appear as remedial displays lbr information sources not monitored, for information not
adequately synthesized, or lot information not made available. In this light, they also seem to signal
not only that some remedial action is required, but also that a system operational failure has
occurred.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN CAWS
It should be made clear that there are no "recipe" or "checklist" type sets of guidelines
available for use in human factors evaluations of MMS's. "l'hert; are only sets of procedures and
methods that ._cem to produce cost-effective activities in the pursuit of rational tcclmical design.
This is probably a technically healthy circt||nstancc given the fuzzy state of our art in the
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extremitiesof its applications. The predetermination of test details - criteria, variablws, controls -
and their application by fiat rather than by rational analysis is not possible and could result in
stifling creativity in solving problems in the system development process. The material in this
section will therefore be general and advisory ratner than specific.
WHERE TO TEST (CONTEXT)
The question of where, when, and how to test during the development process is difficult to
answer beforehand because the need to test and its identity come out of that process. Pointing out
the relative merits of part versus full simulations appears an endorsement of the latter - and it was.
That was on rational, technical grounds. However, availability and cost l.roblems could prohibit the
use of full-mission simulation. That this might be obviated by a pooling of resources in a
community facility seems an increasingly feasible option to the extent that "commonality" can be
realized. However, departing from the fuller task context increases the burden of proof of validity
and relevancy. The discipline has not furnished teols and techniques for systematically estimating
the validity of varying degrees of task abbreviation so this may be difficult.
Before discussing traditional test contexts it should be mentioned that the design process itself
is an ongoing evaluation. Every design decision implies value judgments and thus the solution has
gone through an evaluative process in qualifying for implementation. The more conscious and
explicit this process is made, generally, the more relevant is the solution. However, the following
remarks refer to testing in which, for example, objectivity, repeatability, and quantification are
desired in support of design decisionmaking and end-product assessment.
In-Flight Testing
Testing in the actual aircraft, whether ot a newly fabricated CAWS subsystem or a totally new
aircraft, is difficult and expensive in relation to other methods. If special instrumentation is
required one can quickly become enmeshed in regulatory and airworthiness considerations. The
small subject population sample (test pilots) that would be used with a new aircraft would limit tl:e
usefulness of the results. Moreover, one is faced with tile question of what to measure. In-flight
performance is unique in that acceptable performance deviations are variable. During cruise,
thousands-of-feet off-altitude and miles-off-course can be acceptable data points in an experiment;
during an approach and landing, the acceptable deviations, that is, those tolerances which if
exceeded would cause a safety pilot to take over, are reduced to a few feet. Add this to a strong
desire not to interfere with the ongoing behavior, and an understandable subject resistance to being
instrumented or wired to equipment, and the range of acceptable performance measures becomes
fairly restricted.
The list of practical difficulties with in-flight evaluation could be further extcl_ded - lack of
repeatability, lack of experimental control, etc., but a more interesting consideration in the case of
CAWS is that all test stimuli are, a priori, "'false" alarms. That is so because the subsystem under
test ca:mot be fully conceived as integral with the aircraft system and its in-flight scenario. So much
effort and attention would have to be expended in the separation of test and real alerts that the test
alerts would become unrealistically prominent. This would obviate a valid estimate of their alerting
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ix)wer. "File other two CAWS tim_._tions- infornfing and pilot control-- may not similarly be
compronli.,_,,d, but the mix ol" simulation with flight tmW be an overly hazardous stratagt,m. Flight
tests of new aircraft would place tht` test in the ¢ategot3' of vt`rificalion testing of the aircraft and its
subsystt`ms. Flight tests ot" new subsystems for currt,nt aircrat'l would bt, exploratory, r¢_'olution, or
I't'r(lh'atiols tests, or ;ill thr_'e, :st appropriate points.
Flight Simulation
A li|ll-n)ission sitmdator has man.v obvio;|s advantages over an actual aircraft as a test bed, The
major advantagt, is, of cot|t,'se, tile freedom to manipttlate opt,rational and expt,rimental variables. A
t,,cncral rule is that the more the full tlight-deck tasks art` inch|dt,d and are made re;llistic, the more
valid will bt, the couchtsions drawn from investigations in its context. The representation of tasks
alld infortuation tuanagemcnt activities rather than fidelity of aircraft configuration would st,eenl to
be a reasonable priority. These are not mutually exclusive options, however, and in the absence of
knowledge of how to _lcrifice physical fidelity while ret:lining psychological fidelity it is usually
considt,rcd better to opl Ibr full physical fidelity. Tile ftdl-mission situulators t|st,d in military and
commercial airline training programs represent the extrt,mc in sophistication and ft|netional ¢om-
plett,ness, but tht,y are not usttally intended to se_'c as rt,scarch devices. |lowt,vcr, they arc
extremely cost effective in playing tilt, role tot' which they were designed.
In lht, besl of all possible worlds it might be reconm_ended that a t't|ll-mi_,_ion training
simulator be especially configured lk_r research and dt,veiot'|lneent purl_oSeS, but such would conic
too late in the dcvelop|'tlcnt cycle and bc too t,xpt,nsivt,. A limitatiotl of the high-fidelity simulator is
that it is limited Io the spt,cific aircraft it rt,prest,nts and may bt, of limitt,d value fi_r developing new
aircraft except, perhaps, for retrofit of new or tllodified st|bs.vstems. |loweevt,r, it can also be
reasonably argucd that CAWS' art` not aircraft specific and could be assessed in any similar aircraft
cockpit sitmdation of like complexity.
A good example of both rcsoh|tion and verificalion testing of a newly conceived subsystem in
a full-mission training contt,xt is rt,ported in a paper by Carol A. Simpsotl ("A Synthesized Voice
Approach Callout System tbr Air TraMc Transport Operatiotl," tmpl|blisht,d data) in which a
synthetic voice subs),stenl for making deviation callouts in tile l'imd aplwoach to landip.g
(SYNCALL) was It,sted. Criteria I\_r tht, evaluation wcrc derived fronl opt,ratio||al performance
requirements (aircraft position alld flightpath deviations) and expert opinion (pilot judgnlenlsl.
Wht,n a situulator is to be used in the design of a new configuration it cannot, tH"coulee, )'el
have that ¢onfigltraliOll, except in a general way. Tile situulator would evolvt, only :is tloees tht,
article it sitnt|lalt,s and woldd lhen be availabk, Ik_r testing at the level of verificalioll. Thai is a
reality that fc_rces early design sillluhlli,._ns to bt, tentativee and fttnclional ill nature alld where
gXl'|ioralt':'y and rL'st,lulion Ieslhig wollld appear to be illosl aprorJos, p:lrticularI.v ill lilt' case of a
totally new cockpit configuration. Ilowcvcr, in the ca_c of ('AW,_ it appears l\-asible to inst:lll, say, a
brassboard tllotleel of a Prol×_sed subsystcul into a currt,ntl.v configured simul;_tor cockpit Ik_t"all
three levels of testing exl_loratory, I'esoh|liot_, alltl vt,rificalion. I;_,t,aching a decision in the
seleclion of one frotn two or nlorc i_roposcd tlcsigns cotlltl, thcll, also bc a¢¢ollll'|lishcd ill this
context.
Tile conflict between "test" alerts and "real" alerts mentioned above for flight testing
disappears in tile simulator context. This gives the simulator a decided advantage over in-flight
testing, tempered only by the extent to which test alerts are considered real by test subjects in their
simulated flights.
Part Simulation
Most human factors studies and evaluations are accomplished in so-called part=task simulations
and, as discussed previously, are thus more frequently used for research purposes rather than for the
direct support of the developing system. As used in system support they can be a relatively low-cost
way of making design decisions by side-by-side comparisons of ptoposed solutions. This can be done
in a test site removed from the main stream developmental activities. However, the problem being
studied cannot; it is always integral with and motivated by the design process. Part=task simulations
refer to the completeness of the task under investigation, not to the physical features of the
apparatus employed (see fig. 5). A small task element can be investigated in a full-flight simulator
and, in some cases, profitably studied in a simple mockup. As the task for study assumes more and
more the dimensions of the full task it becomes less easy to isolate it for study. The part-task can
almost always be placed in the full-task simulator for study; the reverse is not true. In addition, in
part-simulations there is also the option of the part-mission, full-task option. In this method only
selected segments of the full mission are used in the study. Those that are used use a full-task
context as in full-mission simulations. This is appropriate for CAWS evah:ations.
However, the size ann the physical configuration of the space used in system-related tests are
not the determining dimensions. What is important is that the task dimensions be veridical with
respect to such aspects as information input and output, procedural activities, functional relevancy
and situational factors (workload, crew interaction, and operational contingencies). The fidelity
continuum discussed before is cast in terms of task complexity not apparatus complexity.
WHAT TO TEST (CONTENT)
The technology of flight management in the National Airspace System is on the verge of
revolutionary changes. The reasons for this will not be pursued here other than to say that
automation of functions previously requiring pilot decision and action appears to be reliable and
economically feasible using digital computer techniques. Many new techt_ologies are available for
new solutions to complex problems. Automation will, of course, bring new problems but they will
relate to the appropriate mating of human intelligence with machine logic for optimum system
management. The position taken here is that redesign of current CAWS is retrogressive and would
result in only superficial changes. Table 2 lists the key differences between methods for change
based on "systems improvement" and "systems change." The table is taken from reference 51
which was "... written to emphasize the difference in intent, scope, methodology.., and results
between imptg,,,'ment and design." And further: "The treatment of system problems by improving
the operation 'isting systems is bound to fail. Systems improvement can work only in the
limited context of ._,,,all systems with negligible independencies with other systems - a condition
that does not occur very often." Finally. "... the Systems Design Approach is basically a
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TABI It: 2.
r--'-
Ihradigm
Thinking proccs._rs
Output
Met hod
l!tuphasis [Outlook
role
COMPARISON OF TWO METIIODOLOGIES OF CHANGE: SYSTEMS
]MPROVEMI_NT AND SYSTI'MS DI'SIGN
S)'stt'lllS inll'_rovctllent
I)e:;ibn| is set
Structure and otx'tation
Analysis Of SysIeI_lS alld CO[Ilt_OIleIll
subsystems(theAnalytical Method)
lX'ductionand redt|clion
|mpto_mct_t of the existiug system
Dctert|_inatio|| of causes of deviations
between intended and actt,al
o|x'ration (direct costs)
I!xplanation of past deviations
[ntrostx, ctive: fl'ord system inward
I:ollowcr: satisfies trends
q Systet||s design
Design is in question
Ptlrpos¢ alK| |'tlllclion
i)_:sign of the whole system
(the Systen|s Approach)
Induction and sytHhesis
Optituization of the whole systern
Determination of diffcrcnce between
actual design and optimum design
(opporttnfity costs)
Predictiotls of future results
l:.xtrospeetive: frolll system outward
Leader: influences trends
(l_clwodttced courtesy of John P. Van (;igch, "'Applied General Systems Theory," 2nd I!d,. Ilarper & Row
Publishers, Inc.. New York, Copyright I t_78.)
methodology of design, and as such it questions the very nature of the system and its role in the
context of the larger system."
System Analysis
To get at the "very nature of the system in the context of the larger system" means that the
source of the rcqttiremcnt ntust bc made explicit. This is accomplished by rational analysis of the
pttrlxasc of the sy._tem of interest in light of the purpose of the parent system. In so doing,
operational perlbrnlance criteria emerge and the qttcstion of what to test has its best chance of
being answered. The fifllowing discttssion follows the general guidelines presented in "'A Systems
Appro:tch to the Settti:tutomation of the National Airspace System" (rcf. 5"). That approach
proceeds from system analysis to system synthesis to system evahtation.
The olwrational reqtlJrt'mt'tlt Tilt" need for a IlleChalliSlll to alert aircrew |11t,lllbers to
deviations in ,tircr;tt't and sttbsystcm pertk_tnm|lce ariscs out of limits in the ability of httmans to
contintmusly nmnitor the total system operation. For instance, tl_c pilot cannot directly observe
internal subsystem states and mttst otherwise be advised when m,dfut_ctions occur. |ligh task
complexity, high workload, low workload, crew interaction, f:ttigue, personal problems, con-
tingency events, all coutril_utc to the diversion of attcntiot_ 1"1"o111the aircraft system monitoritlg-
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task. In order lbr the aircraft systel:l to carry out its operational fl|nction, deviations must be made
known to - transmitted to - tile management and control subsystem - the crew.
Tile operational purpose and function of CAWS, based on these requirements may be stated as
follows: The purpose of the cockpit alerting and warning system is to assist the aircrew in tlleir
m-_;':Iitoring, control and management activities by sensing critical aircraft pertbrmance, configura-
tion. and subsystem deviations, calling them to the attention of tile crew, and informing the crew of
the problem source through aural, visual, and tactile displays: tile essential functions are thus:
sensing, alerting, and informing.
The sensing system is the domain of credibility (false and missed alerts due to malflmction or
the setting of deviation detection thresholds). The alerting function is tile domain of monitoring
and vigilance with its concomitants of disrul_tion and intrusion. The informing function is the
domain of intbrmation transfer with its concomitant of interpretation. Except for aircraft systems
maifimctions, it is notable that the CAWS display system, amplifies or transforms or dichotomizes
continuous information normally available from other cockpit displays. These other displays have a
control associated with them (lever, switch, button, knob, pedal, handle, etc.) and the crew member
doses a loop by activating the control that changes the displayed value or state. Cockpit alerting
and warning systems are different from these other displays: they are only displays. So, while for
most cockpit man-machine functions a clear task requirement Can be stated in terms of observable
activities, the _me is not true of CAWS. It is awkward to state the crew's tasks in relation to these
displays: "to be alerted" or "to be intormed." These are cognitive states, not activity states. They
are not trainable in the sense that conventional tasks arc routinely trainable. The response logic
diagram in figure I indicates that their adequacy can only be evaluated by inferences from activities
"'downstream," that is, response outcomes A. C. E. and F.
Thus, the operational requirement that underlies CAWS is fairly straighttbrward and comes
from a real need. However, it is extremely difficult to obtain objective evidence that the need is
being satisfied. Consequently, one is heavily dependent upon subjective indices of perlbrmance
adequacy.
Requff'ements froot operational ¢'xperiem'¢ .... [n the past, the operational requirement stated
above has been instn_mented somewhat piecemeal by appending to each new or redundant
subsystem its own deviation detection and alerting system. This has resulted in disorderly growth
because of the lack of a unifying system approach. This is partly to blame tbr the general
dissatisfaction with current configurations. But as experience is gained with more and more
complex systems it is becoming apparent that instrumentation of the simply stated operational
requirements leads to some paradoxes which are due to a fundamental incompatibility of discrete
machine logic and human intelligence. Thus, in addition to alerting and inlbrming, CAWS should:
I. Alert but not "'alarm"
2. Intervene but not disrupt
3. lntbrln but not surprise
4. Aid monitoring but not replace it
5. Decwase false alarms without increasing missed alarms
O. Initiate timely but not too hasty action
7. Provide information but not increase workload
42
These almost mutually exclusive goals suggest an underlying antithesis. The machine i_
activated by a fixed, predetermined risk assessment paradigtu: the man, as perceiver, brings to the
interface an adaptive, judgmental, anticipatory paradigm. This basic incompatibility is a core
problem and is the design chaUeage in CAWS.
This incompatibility leads to two extremes - one in which the alert may be perceived as a
redundant nuisance, the other in which it comes as a surprise with a high probability of being
ignored. For example, if a pilot is fully aware of the aircraft system's position and progress in four
dinlcnsions and changes (,deviates) the system a,_ a result of judgment and by choice (,continge|_cy)
the alert will activate in its atttomatic fashion. "I'l,is is at best cotffitmatory, at least redundant, and
at worst a nuisance, possibly disruptive of other ongoing tasks (see cases B and C in the introduc-
tion). In a recent scan of ASRS data bank covering the period August It)7(_ to November !q77, six
GPWS activations were reported. By pilot report of these incidents four of the six were considered
utmeccssat.'y and disruptive, tSee also ref. 53 for an interesting discussion of similar problems with
the altitude alerting system.)
On the other hand, the second kind of extreme is encotmtered when the pilot does not have a
veridical t'_'rcept of the aircraft system's position and progress in lk_ur dimensions and does not
know that it is no|weridical. The activation of a deviation alert can be perceived as a complete
surprise and perhaps deemed incn.'dible (`false, tmbelievable) given the shaky state of alert credibil-
ity, gone'rally. This may have been the case in the two controlled-fligllt-into-terrain accidents cited
in the previous section in which the altitude aural alert presented crucial inlbrmation.
The identification of the intk_rmation required for control has a special meaning with regard to
CAWS. in order to "control" the CAWS, the aircraft and other systems are controlled, that is, the
deviation is remedied. Control requirements over the CAWS itself are not clear. Loop closure is
mainly considered to be through the pilot to the system monitored by CAWS and then the CAWS
display (`see the t'tmctional schematic in fig. 3). Ideally, this might suffice if the alerting system itself
did not introduce problems, such as disruption, startle, and other problems of"bad timing." Since
some or all of these may be obviated in a new system design, the question of the contrt:l uf the
alerting system as a system should be dell'fred until a configuratioti has evolved.
The process of analyzi,_g the system and identifying the functions and tasks to be pcrtbrmed
leads to some co1_clusions about the basic nature of CAWS:
I. CAWS do not serve the system as do other subsystems; they serve the monitor of all those
subsystems. They can, thus, only be evaluated at the t'light-matlagemetlt level of humatl response.
2. The application of the usual task analytic paradigm, display-control-response, is seen not to
apply. Only the disphty is present. The relevant ('entre! is elsewhere. The l't'sptlllXt, may be delayed,
complex (several controls), a_ld is also elsewhere. Therefore, given that the appropriateness of a
response to an alert has been assessed, tkirther evaluation is irrelevant and is in the dotllain of
standard and contingency operating procedures.
3. An aPlwopriatc paradigm for CAWS might be tlisplay-rcsponse-activity, where the response
is cognitive and covert, thus not directly observable. The respotlses are the decision Ol_tions shown
in figure I.
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4. Giventhese departures from tile usual discrete task structure, a "'reaction-time" criterion
lbr performance evaluation does not appear to be a valid discriminator in full-flight management
context. However, an activity delay interval following an alert may be a relevant dependent variable.
Such a measure would have to be evaluated against operdtional criteria, such as allowable safe delay,
flight phase, concurrent workload, and level of urgency.
System Synthesis
[t is well at this point, to note that the purpose of providing a discussion of system analysis
and system synthesis is to arrive logically and naturally at the topic of system evaluation. Although
the contents of the discussion may only be illustrative and sometimes even incorrect, the process is
not. The proof of the process is in tile doing rather than in its discussion; however, in the doing,
frequently the overall goals are lost sight of and one finds that short-term goals obscure long-term
goals, It is not productive to synthesize a system without the knowledge and insights provided by
_he system analysis exercise. It is also not productive to begin synthesis without use of tile
deductive processes. In tl_e deductive process the system operational requirements are developed
into functional requirements of CAWS which appear as: (l) an explicit system logical structure and
function, and (2) a hardware subsystem totally in support of that structure.
The selection of CAWS displays before the logical structure is set will :esult in an implicit
structure determined by lower order elements and inadvertent rather than deliberate choices. That
approach is inductive and more characteristic of system improvement tl:an system design (see
table 2), With a deductive approach, system evaluation will be seen to be a verification of the
system's adequacy in terms of tile operational requirements that guided its design.
A saml_le alt'rthtg system- As discussed above, several CAWS integration schemes have been
proposed by interested groups in the technical community. These proposals are in the form of
functional requirements. They reflect tile deductive process in which operational and system
requirements have been made explicit. Taking a cue from these efforts, a sample alerting system will
be described with which to anchor the discussion to follow,
TABLE 3.. URGENCY MATRIX USING DUAL
CATEGORIZATION
Emergency
Warning
Caution
Performance Configuration Systems
SI.I
SI.2
SI.3
$2-1
$2-2
$2-3
$3-[
$3-2
$3-3
categories, pert'ormancc, collfigttr:|tion, system, and
indicatedio.the urgency levelcolttmu.
Tile proposed systenl logic is tabulated in
table 3. it will be seen that tile first step in
system synthesis - ftmctions allocation
between man and machine - has appeared. In
keeping with other proposed schemes, urgency
level coding and prioritization have been
assigned to tile machine but these assignments
are modifiable by software nlanipulations and
are adaptable it" at_d when required. Tile sample
logic system (SL) shown in table 3. categorizes
the alert two ways: by the three deviation
by the level of immediate response required as
Definitions of the column Iteadinl_,s in table 3 are adapted from the section on "Categories of
Warning Systems," above, They were:
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1. Perfornlancedeviations:departuresfromsafe flight profiles
2. Configuration deviations: departures from aircraft aerodynamic profile for a given regime
3. System deviations: nlalfunctions, faults, inoperability of aircraft and subsystem_
These sources of alerts can interact with each other so they arc not totally independent. There
is a general hierarchy in that configurations subserve perform:race and systems subserve both
configurations and performance.
Tile titles for tile rows oil the left of the matrix ret'_'r to the urgency level of the given
deviation: t, i l"t'mergency" is to indicate that immediate action is required; (2)"Warning" is to
mean that action may be delayed but if not taken an "Emergency" may result; _3)"Caution"
means that the crew needs to program remedial activities into its workload and that the aircraft luay
prt_ceed in an abnormal mode of operation - a longer delay is allowed but if left tmtcnded the
situation could degrade to "Warning" and then to "'t'mergency'" levels.
Some logic schemes propose a fourth category to display information oil system states such as
*'system armed -- tmarmed," **system on- off," and **go- no- go." ttowever, in this sample
system these are arbitrarily excluded for both simplicity and to-enhance the alerting system
purpose.
In each cell. a signal, S 1-1, S 1-2 ..... $3-3, is required. Tile coding possibilities for this nine-cell
matrix could range from one aural with nine levels of dimensionality coding cfrequency, repetition
rate, intensity, etc.) to nine distinct aurals. An option at nlidrange is to use three attrals each with
three coding levels. The scheme selected should retain simplicity so that meaning is immediately
known and training beyond familiarization is not required, tlowever, at this stage in development of
the system logic, :_ choice is not required. This is not to _ly, however, that the exploration of the set
of choices should be delayed.
Tile sample system will also include an alert prioritization scheme so that multiple deviations
will bc presented in order of criticality without overlap or confusion of signals. Another feature that
would apl,car to bc ueedcd is the inhibition of certain alarms as a function of flight phase. Those
deviations that have no et'l\,ct on tile immediate performance of tile system would be postponed.
Workloads are particularly high during takeoff and landing and these flight phases would be the
most critical with regard to attcntional and 111onitoritlg activities by the crew.
A problem with urgency-level coding, prioritization, arid alert inhibits is how to assign
deviations to tile several categories. This requires _l ._et of nonarbitrary rules that involve a host of
relcv:vat parameters. This is, itself, a m:ljor et't\_rt in tile design process and, obviously, cannot form
a part of this doer|merit. Retk'rence 2 recognizes this need and suggests possible methods for
satisfying it. The rclativv itulx)rt:mcc or criticality of various faults, tkliltlrcs, and uaalft|nctions may
also be derived through tile use of other guidance documents. I_or instance, the SAI:. APP t)2t, A
(proposed) "'De:;ign Analysis Procedure lbr Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis" at ld
MIL-SI'I)-2070 "l'rocedures for Fk'rformh_g a Failure Mode I_ffcets and Criticality Analysis."
Failure i_lotle effects analysis provides I\_r a descriptio|l of the crew response required for various
faihJres.
Tht, io.tiJrming fum'tion- ilaving considered a way to structure an alerting logic, it is next
nceessar._' to establish I'tlticlit_ns and rules for inl'ornlitlg the crew. For insl:ince, a "'systetll/warnillg"
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level alert has activated. The crew now needs to know: Which system? What component or
function'? What to do'?
The intbrmit_g tkmctiot_ could have three purposes. On. is the initial message to the crew
concerning the particular component of perlbrmance, co|_figttration, or systen_ that has deviated.
Another is the presentation of the details of the deviation. A third is the presentatiot_ of remedial
measures to correct the deviation. If such remedial text is to be included in a CAWS memory system
it might be better treated separalely. The issue of the interface of CAWS with other flight-
management systems is a real one and ultimately must be considered. For instance, if one or more
cathode-ray tubes (CRT) are used for area navigation (RNAVI and cockpit display of traffic
information (CDTI) it may be possible to use these displays tbr CAWS annunciation and informa-
tion retention. That kind of holistic approach is being pursued in an interesting series of studies by
British Aerospace Enterprises using nine CRT's in a simulator cockpit. Such considerations are not
basically different from the present eflbrt but are beyond its scope.
The informing functio_l is the process of elaborating the initial information in the coded alert.
There is a finite number of ways in which humans acquire information from the envirotu_lent, In
the order of their ability to provide inlbrmation they are visual, aural, tactile, kinesthetic, olfactory.
and gustatory. The last three can quickly be disqualified lbr informing the crew on the basis of
articulation and convenience. (Tactile stimulations can be strong a!erts for human beings- for
example, electric shock and seat prods - but their acceptability is qu,rstionable. The stick-shaker
stall warning is an exemplary application.)
There are only, then, two ways to carry through the informinl,, function that was initiated by
the coding scheme in the system logic discussed above. Them are voice (synthetic'l a:ld visual
at_tnurtciatiota (alphax_ttmeric or CRTI displ_y.
Voice has the advantage that it is attention-getting and does not require shifting ot tile
direction of gaze. It is also direct and can be simple. Also. given that the voice is distinctly different
from all other voice messagx, s, it can be used also for the alerting function. It is recommended in the
SAA. S-7 committee functional scheme that the single atmd "attenson'" be supplemented by
synthetic voice Ibr the most urgent deviations. This tends to agree with the results of :l recent
questionnaire (ref. 54) administered to 50 line pilots. Its purpose was to elicit pilot opinion on
several aspects of alerting and warning system design. The pilots generally were in favor of the use
of synthetic voice but only for very urgent deviations. A distinct disadvantage is that the message is
not storable except by further crew action. That is, it could be held in silent storage b)' a "'hold"
button and recalled tbr later processing, by a recall button or auto|l_atic timing cireuit_'. An
alternative is reiteration of the voice message but that could become obo.oxious for deviations that
are not or cannot be tended to immediately,
Visual displays in support of tile informing function would probably be best selected from
those with a broad message content capability - alphanumeric or CRT displays driven by prepro-
gmmt'ned digital logic. User operating procedures would be strong determinants of the logic
structure, inlbrmation content, Ibrmat, etc., of the displayed inlbrmation. But the selection of
options is based on basic capability provided by the design engi|lcer.
The visual display has the advantage over voice that a much greater alllOtlllt of int'orm:_tion can
be pre._nted. Also, the inlbrmation can be retained on the display for later use. The visual display
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does require one's attention in that it must be looked at to be used. That disadvantage, which is true
for tile initial informing function stage where task disruption can occur, is offset by its power in
deviation alleviation and the establishment of contingency operating procedures. This provides a
natural interface for further subsystem integration into the full tlight-management task.
Three display types have been suggested in the course of this hypothetical system synthesis:
1. An alerting tone or tones coded for category and urgency level
2. Synthetic voice for categorical deviation identification and as a possible alerting aural
3. A visual-textual display for full deviation identification and remedial information
No one of these can fill all of the identified requirements, It can be seen, however, that the
required flow from attention-b_tting In explanation is well supported by the combination. All have
at least rudimentary application in current CAWS. The sample system being syntllesized would
encompass the three levels of inlbrmation articul:*lion with specific displays to be determined.
Crew control- The last element in the CAWS functional structure is crew option and control
over the CAWS itself. This is a difficult problem because such control could, in certain instances,
defeat the purpose of the alerting system. In allowing the crew to cancel, postpone, or inhibit
control ntodes there is the possibility of making the alert ineffective unless a "'remembering" and
reactivation capability is included. The GPWS is an example of the "'double bind" that control or
lack of control implies. The system is certainly of value as is, but as one pilot reporter stated in an
incident from the ASRS survey reported above: "'... it (GPWS) can endanger more lives than it
saves." But if it can be turned oft" (postponed/, when is it appropriate to turn it on again? Just as
some deviations can be inhibited for flight phase, so can these be postponed - stored - for later
manipulation, Almost all system deviations are of this kind but usually performance and cont'igura-
tion deviations are not.
Again, an explicit need is seen to allocate functions to man or machine. The phase-adaptive
alerting system concept is prolx, sed as a machine lkmction that "unloads" the human component.
The gnuple system being discussed xsill be h.vlx_thesized to have such a capability. This might
obviate the requirement for an individual alert postpot_en_ent conlmand. That is to the good
becau._ .a nu0or design goal is to provide a CAWS that dues not increase workload.
Urgency level coding is also a me;'ns fur sot'toning the requir:ment for crew alert cancellation
or postponement. It does so by providing an instantaneous risk-assessment decision: "'respond right
now," "'be ready to rcsr_nd." or "'schedule a resl_nse" _emergency, warning, caution). Giver these
rules, the reiteration of attrals would be limited to only the most critical deviations. An option
would bc visual holding of tlae alert with display flashing and color, intensity, or t'requency coding
for criticality levels as appropriate.
The need to place alerts on hold or to "punch otlt'" aurals cor_es not so nltlch from operational
reqt, irements but seems Io derive from CAWS as currently embodied, it is fairly apparent that any
"'punch.out'" function allocated to crew option shoukl allow cancellation or postponement of the
ah'rting I'tnlction but not the In.limiting function. As stlggested for phasc-adal, tivc inhil_its, this
should be an alert inhibit but not an infonnation-disphLv inhibit. In the sample system being
synthesized all aural alerts except those for the most t,rgent perlk_rmancc dcvi;,tions will be
lransl\'rablc to vistlill display with illforn|ation content intact, using a single control for all
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deviations. (The use of a voice recogni*.ion system for the control function is to be considered.)
Reiterated aurals for critical performance deviations would only be canceliable by appropriate and
immediate control action.
To this point an information processing system structure has been synthesized as a sample.
Many functions previously allocated to the pilot are now allocated to the machine. Its purpose is
illustrative; it is not a proposed system. The system is still "'soft," and changes to the functional and
logical structure are easy to make. This will be le_ true as implementation proceeds to a hardware
configuration. Even then, however, since displays will be versatile and articulable, significant
changes can be effected in the character of the system by software changes rather than hardware
retrofit. This is the conceptual first step in the design process and it is not costly. Several CAWS
functional structures can be designed as candidates for implementation and checked against
operational requirements in the exploratory phase of system evaluation. Multiple conceptual designs
are to be encouraged because there is no single design solution. On the contrary, there are likely
several concepts that would satisfy operational requirements.
The process of actually putting the system together with hardware components is logically, but
not necessarily chronologically, the next step. System test and evaluation is integral with that
process in making design decisions and in assessing the appropriation of the total system for
operational use.
System Evaluation
It has been stated that system evaluation is an on-going proce_, one that starts with the
enunciation of system functional requirements. From that point onward each design decision is
itself an evaluative step. Sources of criteria for these decisions range from engineering experience,
intuition, and expertise, through user requirements and existing relevant data, to the more formal
system-keyed studies and tests.
The application of system-keyed studies is decided upon during the development process.
Whether the test is exploratory, resolution, or verific:,tion depends on the state of evolution of the
system. However, the thinking, planning, and design process should run well ahead of the develop-
ment activities because the operational requirements are known ia advance. Thus, exploratory
testing is as much governed by those requirements as is verification testing but these events, as
activities, require hardware. Table 4 shows the gross steps in system evolution and, in general, where
testing activities would occur. The framework for the evaluation of the sample system is now to be
referred to the emergence of system hardware.
48
TABLE 4.- SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTCYCLE WITH TEST PHASIN(
Development phase Exploratory Resolution Verification
Concept
Breadboard
ikass_oard
System
Use
X
X X
X X
X
X
j."
Note that exploratory testing can begin with the "concept" using paper and pencil techniques
for eliciting pilot (user) critique. The term "breadboard" is understood to mean a shop or
laboratory integration of equipment selected for the assessment of functional concepts. The detail
of such an ensemble could range from a simple tabletop model to a cockpit mockup. The
"brassboard" is understood to mean a system that embodies the functions and standards developed
with the breadboard and used in a particular application, for a specific aircraft. The utilization of
the bra:sboard would be from cocO'pit mockup to full-mission cockpit and the aircraft. Th,"
"system" is that which appears in the production aircraft, a fully developed and integrated
brassboard.
Breadboard testing: system exploration- For the exploration of the system in terms of its
logical functions; its dynamic operation, and the integration of system components, a digital
computer or a microprocessor could be used as a central test apparatus. Such a scheme could
profitably be used throughout all phases of test and, indeed, may itself be central to a newly
conceived CAWS subsystem. This option is co_lceived as a functions and concepts evaluation
technique and will henceforth be called "'facet" to facilitate exposition.
The microprocessor, if such is used, could be programmed and easily reprogrammed to provide
logical functions related to aler:, prioritization, inhibits, urgency levels, holding, and pilot inputs
("store," "give me some information," "recall"). All aircraft deviation sensors would be assumed to
input to the microprocessor. It may also be utilized to store checklists, emergency operating
procedures, and other textual material. The microprocessor would thus be the means for informa-
tion reception, ordering, processing, routing, and transmittal to displays, whatever they might be.
Peripherals to this central facility wound be all those control and display schemes that are
considered to be candidates for the ultimate design:
I. Visual presentation of the centrally manipulated infi_rmation is provided by an alpha-
numeric display, a cathode-ray tube, or it may be displayed by such means as a central annunciator
matrix panel or even in the visual field of a head-up display.
2. Aural presentation of information is by speaker or headset and can include alerting stimuli
and synthetic voice, each provided by appropriate electronic modules.
3. A means would also be provided for crew information input to the central microprocessor.
As with peripheral displays, the peripheral control unit can take as many forms as it is desired to
explore: keyboard, touch panel, and even a microphone and a voice recognition module for possible
verbal control.
4. It must be understood that. given the central information processing capability, one has a
choice of peripherals, limited only by practtcality and relevancy. Tile purpose of facet is not
initially to recommend particular display/control schemes but to furnish a test context for their
evaluation, one that is subordinate to the exercise and evaluation of the information acquisition,
processing, and transmission lode.
A facet may be used at .,nar,y levels of simulatiot, fidelity and complexity. These range from
tabletop demonstrations and game playing tilrough mockups and part-task _imulations to research
flight simulators and Full-mission training simulators. At the simple level, the forcing function is
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derived from scenarios, scripts, and role playing; when a simulated aircraft is the test bed, the
aircraft simulated systems and aircraft responses generate facet operation. "l'he game playing
becomes less a matter of dissimulation and more a matter of realistic simulation aa task fidelity
increases.
A facet would be "loaded" with the logic proposed in the sample system outlined above. The
system would be "exercised" through appropriate inputs and the critique would begin. Questions
that would be asked would be those leading to "proof of concept" evaluations. The source of these
are the operational requirements as revealed by processes illustrated above including the core task
structure shown in figure 1. For example:
1. Does the dual categorization scheme in the sample system provide for immediate crew
understanding without complexity?
2. Does the reduction of aural alerts to one or, even three, provide the needed information? Is
tile reduction acceptable?
3. Does this scheme seem to be attention-getting but not disruptive; that is, is disruption
minimized by inhibits and prioritization?
4. Can tile system include the stereotyped alerts without loss of their current urgency level
coding?
5. Which deviations should be announced by (1) synthetic voice, (2) by coded aurals?
6. Should information for validity checking be included? How?
7. Should an ignored signal be reiterated? How long before such is activated? Repetition rate?
8. Should prioriti::ation be fixed in the microprocessor? Modifiable? By whom?
9. The system was designed to give a first-leve! indication of required response time. Do
observers or experimental subjects behave accordingly?
10. Does the control for transferring auditory infor.,nation to visual information appear
helpful? Should the transfer be automatic?
Tile foregoing questions are a small sample of the perhaps infinite number of questions that
might be posed during system exploratory activities. The better, more pointed ones will only arise
in the actual doing.
Since it is fairly obvious from tile sin,_Je-alert logic shown in figure 1 that there is little
behavior to observe or score, early dimensionalization of responses may not be appropriate.
However, system logic can be checked because facet would make it explicit and Visible. Facet would
also be flexible and could be easily changed to accomnlodate other logic structures. For instance,
the sample system might be changed by rejecting the present column categories ("Performance,"
"Configuration," and "System") and categorizing in terms of "urgency." This, then. wohid be
t¢
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simply a finer urgency level indicator than is provided already by the required level of response in
table 3.
During the breadboard, exploratory phase of evaluation and, in fact, throughout the whole
development testing the major method for relating the system to criteria will be expert judgment.
This is because measurable phenomena are rare and because pilot acceptance is a prime (psychologi-
cal) criterion. This means that u_r response is to be solicited using objective techniques. There is a
body of human factors technology, that deals with means for objectifying subjective impressions -
rating scales, questionnaires, interviews, polls, utility assessment schemes, etc. (ref. 55). It should be
made clear that what is not proposed is system design and evaluation by committee. The emotional
arguments of a lbrceful, but biased, individual or group is a poor source of criteria.
In summary, exploratory testing in early system development is for the purpose of functions
allocation and checkout of those choices. It is best accomplished with a wide-ranging opportunity
to "cut-and-try."
The facet approach could be used throughout system development and system test. It should
include the capability for simulating all the options that any candidate system would draw from. A
candidate CAWS is one that is proposed for a given system; it is developed into a brassboard or
prototype. Facet thus can provide for fast reconfiguration and the checkout of system changes as
soon as they are contemplated.
Component testing: design resohttion- Much of the previous human factors studies of CAWS
have been at the component level. Also, they have been in the main, attempts to evaluate, in
isolation, the alerting power of a proposed or existing alerting system. Component testing in
isolation from the "present" CAWS system is not appropriate in the current development scheme.
The system components are no longer separate entities. Thus, they are not in competition with each
other for the attention of the crew as much as they are in support of the system logic which, in
turn, is supporting flight and resource management activities.
Components of CAWS are those "peripheral" devices used in a facet to interface the system
with the crew to provide information transfer. Alerting tones, synthetic speech, and visual displays
have been mentioned as transfer media.
It is assumed for the sample system that the alerting function will be accomplished by auditory
means. The sample system, as conceived, constrains this to a 3 X 3 code. A signal or signals are to be
selected which best satisfy the dual function of alerting and providing initial information with
regard to the nature and urgency of the deviation. Three basic tones might be selected that can be
interrupted at rates corresponding to the three urgency levels. Another scheme might be to consider
a chime, a tane, and, say, a clacker, each of which is to be repeated three times for highest urgency,
two times for the next level anti once for the least. There are a great many possible combinations of
alerting sounds and coding dimensions. A facet that has the characteristics suggested could provide
for early trial and selection from a very large set.
The selection of a few combinations for resolution testing can be accomplished by exercising
the breadboard system with experienced line pilots acting as in-flight users. This reouires the
development of at least simple scenarios, but the effort is not wasted because scenarios will be
required for later full system evaluation.
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The set. of candidate aural coding ,: :hemes can be evaluated by techniques appropriate to tee
elicitation o:" preverbal pilot judgment. That is, an opinion is not solicited. What is sought is a
judgment in _vhich each scheme is forced into a position on a utility rating or ranking scale such as
through the use of a card-sort process (see ref. 55). Utility assessment methods are developing that
lead to objectificat;on and quantification of subjectively evaluated multifaceted phenomena. This
kind of judgmental response can, Of course, be acquired from paper and pencil techniques but Jacet
provides an opporturity to see and use the set of options to be evaluated. Unlike many other
decisionmaking tasks, the set of outcomes is visible and even modifiable.
If the options for at.-al alert coding can be reduced to a single scheme, then no further teshng
is required. This will generaUy not be the case because there probably will be several that can satisfy
the operational requirements. Other criteria that will enter into component selection and which
may be brought to bear at this point include cost, size, weight, availability, and power consumption.
If these, and even such things as product aesthetics, do not provide discriminators, then a formal
side-by-side test would be in order. This wquld involve a conventional experimental paradigm,
control of dependent and independent variables, and the selection of an appropriate criterial
performance score. The latter might be the number of correct responses to the alerting code in unit
time. The test stimuli would be presented in a "fast-time" scenario with subject workload to include
at least one other attention-diverting task. Fast-time means that many events are compacted into a
shorter intev/al than they would normally occupy. Obviously, a test of this kind requires subjects
who are willing to "play the game." It is suggested that naive subjects not be used anywhere in the
system development and evaluation process. The use of such subjects assumes that fundamental
processes are being evaluated. They are not. The population sampled must be representative of
experienced, highly trained, and equipment-sophisticated line pilots.
In a manner similar to the above for the coded alerting signal, other candidate components are
processed. Another example is the need to determine when voice annunciation is to be used either
in addition to or in lieu of the primary audio alert. Starting with the notion that synthetic voice
ought to be used only with the most urgent deviations several combinations are possible. Should
voice be used only for the "emergency" row in the dual category alerting scheme in table 3? Should
it be used only for the "performance" deviations column in that matrix? And what about the first
two columns and the first two rows?
These options can be "brought up" on facet and evaluated by the judgment of experienced
subjects. Again, obviously inadequate schemes will become apparent, particularly if there has been
no attempt to limit options. And, again, selection between two or more adequate candidates is
accomplished by resolution testing, other things being equal.
The fitting of the display interface to the information processing scheme also has a set of
relevant questions that characterize the nature of the decisions required:
1. What is the nature of the auditory alerts which best mate with human capabilities?
Intensity? Frequency? Timbre? Presentation rate? Acceptability? Signal/noise ratio (see ref. 21 and
related human factors data)?
2. W_ere is the voice to be used? When used, does the alerting aural precede it? Or is it
inhibited'?
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3. _ ._ GPW$ would fall in the "performance-emergency" cell in table 3. Can the GPWS be
integrated into the sarr.7::, matrix and use the same synthetic voice as all the other cells?
4. Is it desirous to integrate all other discrete or stereotyped alerts into this basic scheme?
Should the fire bell be voice annunciated at a "system-emergency" level or be kept separate?
5. Is the flow of information from alerting and initial informing to full informing a meaningful
progression that has optimized the contribution of the alerting aural, voice annunciation, and visual
annunciaton2
6. Is there a need for an alphanumeric, single line display for visual display of short messages'. )
How could this be made parallel to coding logic for auditory displays? Would changes in flash rate,
color coding, or brightness for "emergency," "warning," "caution" levels of urgency be appropriate
to evaluate?
7. Can the "one liner" alphanumeric display be accomplished through the use of a CRT that
can also present textual material for problem analysis and remedy?
8. Or, from a human engineering viewpoint, since there is as yet no central display for the
sample CAWS, might the alphanumeric stand as such? It could be mounted in the same central
position as current master warning panels. It would add to the information contained in the coded
alerting aural but full information would be presented automatically and simultaneously on a CRT.
9. If the CRT is used also as an alerting element what coding is to be used such that visual
coding is parallel to auditory coding?
10. How are inhibited alerts to be displayed and activated whet,, "_heinhibit regime is departed?
1 I. How are multiple alerts to be displayed assuming predetermined prioritization rules?
Again, this sample set of questions is far from complete but illustrates the kinds of concerns
that govern the component (display) selection process and that require evaluation activities.
In the normal flow of logic that takes place in moving from operational requirements to
hardware it is now reasonable to apply human engineering design principles, for example, display
location, brightness, legibility of visual material, formats, control location, and size and shape (see
refs. 2 and 21). An interesting human engineering question is whether the many amber and red
caution and warning lights which currently clutter the cockpit can be eliminated.
Operational testing: system verification- As has been alluded to several times there is no
single, perfect CAWS that is the only answer to the operational requirements. Many candidate
systems could be designed that would be satisfactory in that respect. Thus, the testing is of a system
against those requirements rather than a s;,'stem against a system, as is appropriate in resolution
testing.
Obviously, it is no longer possible to refer to the sample system except in basic function. That
is because of activities carried out as outlined in the previous two sections. They would have
resulted in a configuration that cannot be visualized without the test results. Also, examples, like
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analogies, should not be pushed too far. However. what is still perceptible are tile operational
requirements.
Performance criteria: Given that the operational requirements are reasonable the crite:ia for
operational test are:
1. Tile system is in consonance with the stated operational requirement. This is suppor:ed by
clear system logic, functional integration, and integration into tile larger monitoring task.
2, Tile seven principal paradoxes of CAWS, as currently embodied, have been minimized
(p. 42, above).
3. Nuisance, disruption, startle, and pilot dissagisfaction (psychological criteria) have been
minimized or eliminated.
4. Tile response alternatives shown by tile junctions in the single alert logic diagram in figure 1
are clear and executable under all flight deck task loads.
Items (I) through (3) are criteria to which system characteristics can be compared mainly,
perhaps only, by expert judgment. Item (4) includes elements that allow counting: missed alerts,
false responses, incorrect responses, true responses, and response timeliness (see t_g. 1). But the
comparison of each of these to a criterion nunlber is not possible because such numbers do not
exist. (They would be ideal in a resolution test between two systems, though the "winner" would
still require operational verification.) These too, then. would be subject to evaluation by expert
judgment, except lbr the last one. response timeliness. The same parameters and decision rules that
were used to develop urgency levels and alert prioritization may be used to establish criterial
response times.
Tllus, in addition to the use of expert judgment, which has been used extensively throughout
development testing, there appear to be the following performance characteristics that are relatable
to objective indices: (1) Response time with respect to time r .attired/time available: (2) Response
correctness and scheduling with respect to deviation urgency and priority: and (3)Timeliness and
correctness of validity checking where possible.
The test context is to be designed to "tease out" these perlormance characteristics. It is
important to distinguish between the task-oriented time measure (response time) and reaction time.
Althougl_ reaction time has frequently been used as a performance measure in laboratory evahza-
lions of alerting systems, there are difficulties associated with its use. Almost anything that afl\'cts
human behavior affects reaction time. Forbes _ref. 56) found a Ikdl stomach slowed a reaction time
to sound, but not to light, for example. It reveals something about a _wto'al response to given stimuli
but nothing about response appropriateness in real world tasks. As a matter of fact, Fitts's classic
analysis of 480 pilot-error accidents does not include any that are due to slowness in responding
(ref. 57).
Contextual ctmsidcrations: Tile context for verifie.'ttion testing must inchitle ,'dl the tasks,
conditions, contingencies, and workloads that are to bc expected in actual operation of the system.
The tcsti_,L" arena is characterized by the attributes shown at the far right of figure 3, at least in
terms of task-fidelity.
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Even in this full-task context a problem arises immediately. The problem is peculiar to any
flight-deck oriented research. That is the problem of having a sufficient number of events occur in a
necessarily limited time period for observation and counting. This problem is particularly acute in
the case of CAWS because of the low probability of occurrence of deviations.
A way to provide enough events for evaluation purposes is to use the previously mentioned
"fast-time" simulation in which events are compacted into a shorter time period than would be true
in operation. With appropriate planning and scenario building these can be made realistic in all
aspects except their probability of occurrence. This is known to be acceptable to pilots for training
purposes. Although not realistic, valid results can be obtained if the test subjects are willing to "play
the game," and are prebriefed to accept theprobabilities as being temporarily real. Note that the
events and related performance are in real time; what is time-shortened are the intervals between
events and their frequency of occurrence is increased.
A related problem is that of the psychological "set" of test subjects who are always fully
conscious that CAWS is the reason for the test. This is a state of sensitization totally different from
real-world monitoring readiness levels. Even if it is not made explicit, the purpose of the test will be
transparent to experienced pilots. As mentioned previously, however, this may compromise the
evaluation of only the alerting function. The measurement of response time and deviation dispensa-
tion is not necessarily similarly compromised.
Another difficulty is one that is peculiar to the nature of the task. That is the element of
coven behavior which makes ignored, missed, and postponed alarms (fig. 1) all look alike, at least
initially. If, however, a postponement action is required of a crew member the behavior becomes
observable. That may be a pilot control option in i he CAWS itself or it may be injected into the
full-task simulation as an element of the experimental apparatus.
It has been stated that the important consideration in the design of the test context is that it
be totally representative of the flight-deck task structure. This requires sample scenarios based on
real world operations and operational contingencies, opportunities to exercise resource management
and flight management activities, and representative workloads. Workload is an area of technological
applications that is ill-defined in theoretical construct and difficult to quantify. There is no
generally accepted definition of workload at a formal and comprehensive level (see the survey of
concepts in ref. 58). However, this lack does not prohibit the inclusion of workload in many applied
studies. It would, however, be appropriate to have at least an operational definition in hand. Chiles
(ref. 5) offers such a descriptive definition for the case of pilot workload. The Chiles report is
recommended for guidelines in conceptualizing and planning for the inclusion of appropriate
workload levels for the CAWS test context. Artificial and/or secondary tasks unrelated to flight
deck activities are not herein recommended. What is recommended is the design of scenarios that
include high operational workloads.
Finally, it will be necessary to observe performance in the test simulation in order to collect
data on those behaviors that can be scored. Also, observation of the total task activities will yield a
great amount of information with regard to general CAWS operability, the appropriateness of the
test design, and other information that cannot be anticipated. It will be necessary to train observers
to be knowledgeable in the operational tasks and to be sensitive to the occurrence of test related
events.
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The character of tile questions to be asked during verification testing may be indicated by the
following sample:
I. Does the CAWS man-machine task appear consonant with other ongoing tasks?
2. Is the crew able to schedule CAWS events without undue disruption?
3. Has the ideal of a "quiet cockpit" (both auditory and visual) been realized?
4. Are all deviations displayed? Have some arisen which were not anticipated but will be of
help if included now?
5. How easy is the system to modify, given the availability of sensing methods?
6. What is the general reception of experienced crews to the integrated system? Enthusiastic?
Approval? Conditional approval? Disapproval? Enthusiastic disapproval?
7. The operational test may be construed as a precursor to certification. Does the system
comply with all FAR's? Any conflicts?
8. Is the operability clear and simple requiring less training than current systems?
9. CAWS, new seen as an integrated subsystem, can be included in the aircraft operating
manual, as a subsection. Has such been written and used in the operational test?
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, Calif. 94035, August 6, 1979
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